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ABSTRACT 
 
Hedge funds have historically been important investments in diversified portfolios of 
wealthy individuals and institutional investors. However, recent economic environment 
and events including the financial crisis of 2008 have increased investors’ awareness of 
the restrictions related to hedge funds such as high fees, lock-up periods, illiquidity and 
lack of transparency. Roused by these problems some investors have begun to look for 
products yielding returns similar to hedge funds without their disadvantages. The goal 
of this thesis is to conduct and examine the linear hedge fund replication portfolios that 
aim to generate returns comparable to hedge funds with lower fees and increased 
transparency, functioning as potential components of alternative investment allocation. 
 
In this thesis, linear multivariate factor models are estimated to ten Credit Suisse Hedge 
Fund Indices from the Credit Suisse Asset Management LLC –database in order to 
examine risk exposures of these indices to common factors during time period from 
2004 to 2015. Eight different factors, selected based on previous research and their 
ability to explain the hedge funds’ risk exposures are included in the model. The 
estimated beta coefficients from the risk exposure analysis are then used as portfolio 
weights for the eight factors in order to conduct monthly returns for the replication 
products. Both fixed-weight linear clones and 24-month rolling-window linear clones 
are conducted. The monthly clone returns for both fixed-weight and rolling-window 
clones are compared to their target Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Indices. 
 
Results suggest that for certain indices a significant fraction of their risk can be captured 
by common factors in the linear factor model. Although the performance of the linear 
clones can be inferior to their hedge fund index benchmarks, they still offer similar 
levels of diversification benefits as the target indices. Finally, neither the fixed-weight 
nor the 24-month rolling window linear clones do perform well enough to be considered 
as alternatives to hedge funds.  
 
 
KEYWORDS: Hedge fund replication, passive hedge fund replication, risk exposure 
analysis, linear factor model 
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1. INTRODUCTION !
Hedge funds have gained enormous popularity in recent decade. The notable growth in 
the hedge fund industry is largely due to their promises to create above average market 
neutral returns. Due to variety of investment strategies and assets that hedge fund 
managers are able to utilize, the funds have been able to generate returns with relatively 
low correlation with common asset classes like stocks and bonds. Unlike managers of 
mutual funds, hedge fund managers have got a possibility to invest in more exotic assets 
such as derivatives, use leverage and sell short (Duanmu, Li and Malakhov 2015). 
Historical evidence, however, claims that hedge funds have failed to fulfill these 
attempts in many cases. According to Hedge Fund Research (2015), in 2014 hedge 
funds gained 4,10 percent being behind the Standard & Poor’s 500 which gained 9,87 
percent. Hedge funds are no longer giving superior performance and therefore, they are 
progressively sold on the back of a diversification argument (Kat and Palaro 2005: 62).  
 
At the same as popularity towards hedge funds increased, they became a subject to 
criticism. The most common critiques are towards their lack of liquidity, transparency, 
opaque holdings and 2-20 fee structures. After the financial crisis in 2008 investors 
became even more aware of issues such as illiquidity and lockup periods that are often 
associated with hedge funds. Many investors increased their awareness about hedge 
funds and began to look more closely not only how the funds generated returns but also 
where these return flows came from (Jaeger and Wagner 2005). Due to the financial 
crisis many investors realized that they were actually paying alpha-level hedge fund 
fees for beta-only performance. After these challenges, alternative investment products 
have become a focus area for investors.  
 
To create demand for alternative investments, avoiding the problems of hedge funds, 
numerous financial institutions have developed new products and portfolios that attempt 
to clone the returns of hedge funds offering liquidity and transparency with lower-cost 
(Bollen and Fisher 2013: 80). This thesis aims to capture the appropriate use of these 
hedge fund clones by building a replication model using risk exposures of hedge fund 
indices and further empirically examine the hedge fund replication procedure.  
 
The performance of the hedge funds has largely been questioned among pension funds 
and other large institutional investors after the year 2014 showed to be the weakest for 
the hedge funds since the financial crisis and year 2008. In September 2014, The 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (Calpers) announced to stop investing 
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in the hedge funds. This largest U.S. pension fund decided to pull out its 4 billion that it 
had invested across 24 hedge funds and six hedge fund-of-funds. With over 300 billion 
dollars in assets, the fund announced making the decision because their investments 
were no longer cost-efficient and also, because the investments had become too 
complicated. Calpers wrote that in July, their investments returned 18,4 percent during 
the fiscal year that ended on June 30 with hedge funds gaining 7,1 percent whereas 
private equity investments returned 20 percent (Reuters 2014, Fortune 2014a.) After the 
announcement, Fortune (2014b) wrote that, “this will not kill the industry, but will 
require a lifestyle change for it”. This suggests that the financial markets are in a need 
of new hedge fund replication products – alternatives for actual hedge funds.  
There are replication products that are already available to institutional investors, such 
as Goldman Sachs Absolute Returns Tracker Index, Merrill Lynch Factor Index, Long 
Barclays Alternatives Replicator USD TR Index and Morgan Stanley Altera index. 
These products are either for the specified hedge fund strategy or for the overall broad 
hedge fund industry. Moreover, imitation funds such as Global X Guru Index and Alpha 
Clone Alternative Alpha also exist. The imitation funds invest directly to long positions 
that are observed from the 13F filings of top fund managers. (Subshash and Enke 2014: 
1959.) IndexIQ, one of leading investment solution providers globally, has continuously 
announced new hedge fund replication indices (IndexIQ 2015). IQ Hedge Indices aim to 
replicate the performance by utilizing replication and alternative beta strategies. The 
IndexIQ was established in 2006 and since then it has been growing significantly with 
popularity and established more replication indices. Despite the existence of replication 
products for investors who seek alternatives for hedge funds, these replication products 
are still often functioning like hedge funds: charging high fees with methods that are 
largely unknown. 
 
1.1. Background !
The history of researchers attempting to build hedge fund replication strategies and 
portfolios aiming to generate returns similar to hedge funds is relatively short. A study 
performed by Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) has undoubtedly paved the way for more 
recent research attempts. They showed that for certain hedge fund categories it is 
possible to obtain comparable returns using a linear factor model approach. To justify 
the novelty of hedge fund replication research, Duanmu et al. (2014) point out there is 
no set of factors that would be globally accepted when conducting factor based 
! 11 
replication procedure. Although the hedge fund replication is a relatively new field of 
finance, investors have aimed to find and understand the source of excess returns of the 
best portfolio managers’ portfolios for a much longer time. Sharpe (1992) introduced a 
method that benchmarks mutual fund performance explaining the portfolio returns in 
terms of various asset classes. He conducted an asset class factor model to analyze 
mutual fund performance and suggested that the fund return has two components: asset 
class factors, which he calls “style”, and uncorrelated residual, which he calls as 
“selection”.   
At the time of writing, there is a lack of existing studies; in particular lack of jointly 
accepted methods. This is to be concluded, because there is no globally accepted way to 
execute the replication process even though it has been examined for over ten years. 
There is an ongoing discussion of the best replication method and researchers try to find 
new techniques that could bring better replication performance.  
 
1.2. Purpose and hypothesis !
The hypothesis of this thesis relies on prior literature. Earlier research has shown that 
common factors are able to explain hedge funds’ risk exposures but the results from the 
replication attempts vary substantially (Fung and Hsieh 2004, Hasanhodzic and Lo 
2007, Hayes 2012). There is no widely accepted method to compute the replication 
procedure and therefore, this thesis presents novel aspects for the replication process by 
applying the earlier research findings. The goal is to strengthen earlier findings and 
pave way for larger acceptance for those findings. However, since novel data and new 
methodology combinations are applied, new findings can be obtained. The linear factor 
model applied is a new combination of factors used in prior literature (e.g. Fung and 
Hsieh 2004). Finally, this thesis hypothesize that the linear factor model constructed can 
explain major part of the hedge fund indices’ risk exposures to common factors and 
further, the conducted replication products outperform their target indices. Methods to 
measure the performance of the conducted products are introduced in chapter 5. Sample 
period is 11 years: from September 2004 to September 2015. As we have 7 years after 
the financial crisis and year 2008, the results also reveal how well the replication 
products have performed during and after the financial crisis.  
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1.3. Structure of the thesis !
The structure of the thesis is following: first, a closer look at the basic blocks under the 
hedge fund replication procedure is given. Thereafter, a preview of prior literature is 
given with a discussion of benefits and weaknesses of replication procedures. The 
fourth and fifth sections present data and methodology applied. Finally, the last sections 
introduce empirical results and make a discussion of them.  
 
The next section introduces a theoretical framework for the topic and aims to clarify the 
idea behind the overall replication process. A brief introduction to different replication 
methods is given. Also, a review to concepts of alpha, alternative alpha and alternative 
beta is given. The third section, the literature review, introduces research papers that all 
together aim to give a broad picture of different aspects of the hedge fund replication.  
 
Fourth section introduces the data employed. Summary statistics of all data is presented. 
Fifth section presents the methods. Models are showed with explanations why they are 
applied with chosen data. Finally, results are given for both the fixed-weight and the 24-
month rolling window linear clones. The estimated monthly returns are further 
compared to the target indices. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the results and 
a brief comparison with earlier research.  
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
To a large extent, empirical research has shown that the hedge fund returns can be 
explained by market exposures to common factors and therefore the returns are possible 
to replicate (e.g. Fung and Hsieh 2004, Roncalli and Jerome 2007, Hasanhodzic and Lo 
2007). There are a number of replication products already available for investors, 
mainly created by banks that have utilized the factor-based approach created by 
academic research. In the factor-based approach one tries to decompose returns of a 
group of hedge funds into factors. When the returns of target hedge funds are broken 
into these chosen factors it is possible to create a strategy attempting to replicate the 
performance of these hedge funds. These factors should be investable and liquid.  
 
2.1. Concept of hedge fund replication !
The simplest concept of asset replication is a mutual fund or exchange-traded fund 
(ETF) on the S&P 500 index (Chatterjee 2014: 333). The purpose behind the hedge 
fund replication is that investors could earn the same returns than hedge funds with 
lower costs, increased transparency and possibly even better liquidity and 
diversification. In order to mimic the risk-return profile of different hedge fund 
strategies, one has to utilize either common factors or liquid products like futures 
contracts (Bollen and Fisher 2013). The factors used are often investments in different 
asset classes: equities, bonds, fixed income and commodities. This thesis applies the 
linear factor approach in order to find the risk profile of ten target indices by employing 
eight factors identified in previous research. Further, these risk exposures are then used 
as portfolio weights of the common factors in order to construct the clone portfolios.  
As discussed earlier in chapter 1, the factor-based replication can be attributed already 
to Sharpe (1992) who utilized a linear factor model in order to measure the relation 
between the returns of specific investments to returns of standard asset classes. Further, 
he applied the model to mutual funds and found that estimates of factor exposures 
correspond to certain mix of assets in these funds. This combination of linear replication 
and buy-and-hold factors has been distinguished e.g. by Fung and Hsieh (2004) and 
Bollen and Fisher (2012). The approach may be unable to capture the nonlinearities 
between hedge fund returns and those of standard assets. Nonlinearities arise for 
example by positions in securities such as credit default swaps that have option-like 
payoffs (Bollen and Fisher 2013: 4). Further, the dynamic exposures can be captured in 
linear factor models whether the factor loadings can vary over time. Due to these 
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arguments, a rolling-window approach is applied besides the fixed-weight approach in 
this thesis. The rolling-window approach is argued to capture the time-varying 
exposures.  
 
2.2. Different replication strategies !
The hedge fund replication can be based on three different methods. The most popular 
approach involves estimating the target fund’s factor exposures using Sharpe’s (1992) 
asset-class factor model approach (e.g. Hasanhodzic and Lo 2007) to find beta 
coefficients and determine the weights for the clone portfolios. Briefly, this method 
often referred to as linear replication method tracks hedge fund returns by estimating 
exposures to different risk factors with a linear regression model and then invest in 
different asset classes according to risk factor exposures. The rationale behind this 
method is that a significant part of the hedge fund returns can be explained by a linear 
relationship to a set of common assets.  !!!!!!!!!!!!
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Hedge fund replication methods. 
 
The second method is called a rule-based method. This method is sometimes referred to 
as the mechanical or trade-related method. Traders try to isolate broad fundamental 
concepts of hedge fund strategies and mimic these with automated trading algorithms 
(Wallerstein, Tuchschmid and Zaker 2010: 38).  
Econometric approach 
Risk factor model 
Trading approach 
Hedge fund replication 
Distributional model 
Rule-based model 
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The third approach to hedge fund replication is the so called distributional replication 
method first suggested by Kat and Palaro (2005). This approach uses complex trading 
strategies to find matches from historical returns of a target fund. Distribution-based 
clones try to mimic the historical return distribution of the target out-of-sample. Amin 
and Kat (2003) conduct an unconditional distribution in their paper whereas the paper of 
Kat and Palaro (2005) conducts a bivariate distribution of the target’s return and return 
of another asset, for example a stock market index.  
Each method has its proponents but the commercial applications currently available to 
investors mostly rely on the factor-based approach with a smaller number of investors 
using the mechanical approach. This thesis applies the factor-based replication due to 
several reasons. First, Amenc et al. (2008) argues that using the distributional approach 
would require a relatively long estimation period to establish the target distribution 
using historical returns. In addition, the distributional replication processes utilize 
complex mathematical techniques to create high-frequency trading systems that are not 
in a purpose of this thesis.  
Earlier studies do not provide much results of market-timing ability of the target. 
However, Bollen and Fisher (2013) conclude that it is a substantial issue in replication 
process. According to them it can be examined in two different ways. Firstly, one can 
estimate exposures to factors that are constructed to reflect the returns of active market-
timing strategies. Another way is to use a model that allows exposures to standard asset 
classes to vary conditional on the magnitude of asset returns. In other words, larger 
exposure is allowed during higher market returns and vice versa.  
Of the earlier research, Griffin and Xu (2009) attempt to find market timing ability. 
They use equity holdings of hedge funds from quarterly SEC Form 13F filings. 
However, they do not find significant evidence concerning hedge fund managers able 
turn capital among different styles in advance of high returns. Also Cheng and Liang 
(2007) find some evidence of the market timing ability, but only from a small set of 
hedge funds. Finally, Hayes (2012) in his paper completely fails to find market timing 
in hedge fund index clones. Despite possible interesting aspects of the replication 
products’ market timing ability, a deeper market timing analysis is not made in this 
thesis in order to keep the research comprehensive. 
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2.3. Alpha & alternative beta !
Alpha – or managerial skill, as many financial analysts may call it – is a correlation of 
returns with undefined factors in a regression. It is the part of the returns that cannot be 
explained by traditional factors. The hedge fund industry used to think that fund 
managers can generate alpha through their skills and again, high hedge fund returns. 
The academic studies have, however, shown that much of the hedge fund returns are 
actually due to systematic risk exposures rather than alpha and therefore, the arisen 
popularity of term “alternative beta”. It would not be even possible to replicate the 
alpha, since it includes superior information about market inefficiencies (Jaeger and 
Pease 2008: 5).  
 
In contrast, Fung and Hsieh (1997) argue that hedge funds tend to have lower 
correlations with traditional asset classes and that this is a consequence of better 
performing hedge fund managers with more skills compared to those of mutual funds. 
However, later they realize that the interpretation is inconsistent with evidence that 
hedge funds often perform poorly when asset markets perform very poorly (Fung and 
Hsieh 2004: 67). They conclude that the same way as mutual funds, hedge funds are 
exposed to risks that are just different of those of mutual funds.   
 
Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) include the alpha in their model. For all hedge funds 
included in the sample, positive average alphas are found ranging from 0,42% per 
month to 1,41% per month. They argue that for their sample of 1610 individual hedge 
funds, 61% of the average total return is due to the manager specific alpha. The values 
are still ranging a lot between the strategy specific funds. Over 80% of the average total 
return of Equity Market Neutral funds is due to alpha. The same value for Managed 
Futures is -27,5%.  
Mikhail Tupitsyn and Paul Lajbcygier (2015) examine passive hedge funds in their 
recent study and find that two-third of hedge funds exhibit only linear exposures and 
therefore, are passive. According to their research, most hedge fund managers do not 
generate returns through managerial skill. Moreover, these passive portfolios are found 
to outperform most of the active managers. They also show that active managers often 
eventually become passive. Their recent findings justify the use of passive linear 
replication in this thesis.  
Some studies may also refer to alternative alpha, which is an additional return on top of 
existence alpha (Lin 2014: 1). The concept was first proposed to distinguish 
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outperformed hedge funds to others. Fung and Hsieh (2003) even suggested 
decomposing the hedge fund return into an idiosyncratic (alternative alpha) and a 
systematic (alternative beta) component. Whereas the term “alternative beta” refers to 
the part of returns that is achievable, “alternative alpha” refers to the part of the returns 
that is not easily achievable by replication methods (Fung and Hsieh 2007: 47). 
However, in this thesis an alpha referring to the managerial skill return and a traditional 
beta are the terms that are used further and analyzed. 
 
But if it really is so that the hedge fund returns are more due to beta rather than alpha, it 
makes more sense to replicate the hedge funds rather than to directly invest in them. 
Alternative beta is a modified version of the traditional beta. Sharpe introduced the 
parameter with capital asset pricing (CAPM) model in 1992. He stated that in 
equilibrium after risk adjustment assets have same return:  
(1)                                 ! !! = !!! + !!! !(!! − !!] 
From this model, the unexplained excess return (or alpha) can be expressed as: 
(2) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! = ! !! − !! ! !! − !! − !! 
where  !! presents the asset’s risk and can be formulated as following: 
(3) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! = !"#!(!!,!!)!"#(!!)  . 
 
To conclude, traditional betas are referred to traditional investments, for example stocks 
and bonds. To compare, the definition of alternative beta requires techniques different 
from traditional ones, such as short selling and use of derivatives. These techniques are 
usually associated with hedge funds, and hence the term of alternative beta in context of 
hedge funds.  
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Several publications have dealt with pros and cons of hedge fund replication and the 
theory of alternative beta. Researchers have tried to replicate individual funds, funds-of-
funds indices and strategy specific indices. The results have been mixed. Other studies 
find the passive fixed-weight linear clones to generally perform better compared to their 
benchmarks whereas other find the rolling-window approach with time varying beta 
coefficient to yield better performance. The pros and cons may also vary between 
academic literature and practise. Although the rolling-window approach would bring 
better results in the academic research, it may require frequent rebalancing of a portfolio 
in practise and therefore turn out to be unpractical and costly. In this chapter a 
discussion about the aforementioned themes is given. Different methods, approaches 
and their results are introduced trough prior literature. In particular, main studies in the 
field of linear factor replication are presented more detail.  
 
3.1. Prior literature 
 
Already in 1992, William Sharpe performed a study that later inspired many researchers 
to study the concept of hedge fund replication. He decomposed returns of a mutual fund 
into two components: asset class factors such as growth stocks and government bonds, 
which he calls as “style”, and an uncorrelated residual part that he interprets as 
“selection”. He constructed a replicating portfolio by relying on constrained beta from 
linear regressions on a set of factors and empirically demonstrated that only a limited 
number of major asset classes are needed to replicate the performance of U.S. mutual 
funds.  
 
Inspired by Sharpe´s (1992) findings William Fung and David A. Hsieh (1997) 
extended his model into hedge funds and added new factors: short selling and 
derivatives. They argued that the reason why Sharpe’s study got success was that most 
mutual fund managers invest similarly with traditional asset managers and therefore, 
they are likely to generate returns that are highly correlated to returns in major asset 
classes. Fung and Hsieh (1997) framework takes into account traditional managers as 
well as alternative managers with absolute, not only relative target returns and conclude 
that hedge funds apply dynamic strategies and generate nonlinear return profiles and 
therefore, follow strategies totally different from mutual funds. 
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Fung and Hsieh have paved the way for later replication attempts. Without denying, 
their most famous paper in this field is the “Hedge Fund Benchmarks: A Risk-Based 
Approach” from 2004. In this paper, they further examine the finding that the hedge 
fund returns are less correlated to traditional asset classes. They introduce a model that 
has later given motivation for a majority of replication researchers using linear factor 
models. As a result, their seven asset-based style factors (ABS) were able to explain up 
to 80 percent of monthly return variations in the hedge funds.  
As a proxy for hedge fund portfolios Fung and Hsieh (2004) exploit monthly returns for 
the HFR Fund of Fund Index. The returns of the index are then regressed on the seven 
factors from 1995 to 1998 and 2000 to 2002. Two of the factors are stock-factors, two 
interest-rate factors and last three option factors. The two stock factors are the return on 
S&P 500 (S&P) and the difference between returns on Wilshire 1750 Small Cap and 
Wilshire 750 Large Cap (SC-LC). As interest rate factors, the change in the 10-year U.S 
treasury bonds (10Y) and the difference between Moody ́s Baa bonds and U.S. Treasury 
bond (CredSpr) are included. The three option factors include lookback options on 
bonds (BdOpt), currencies (FXOpt) and commodities (ComOpt). Lookback option is an 
option that gives the buyer an option to buy the underlying asset at the lowest price 
during its duration. Similarly, a seller gets an option to sell the option at the highest 
price during the duration. When regressed the factors against HFRFOF, HFR fund of 
funds index, the two equity factors (S&P500 and SC-LC) and the two fixed-income 
factors (10Y and CredSpr) show statistical significance for the whole first estimation 
period from 1994 to 2002. For the two trend-following factors (BdOpt and ComOpt) the 
exposures are statistically significant whereas FXOpt shows to be insignificant for the 
full period. To summarize the findings of Fung and Hsieh (2004), on average, hedge 
funds have systematic risk exposures to equity and interest rate bets as well as to long-
short equity and credit spread bets. Their findings motivate the factor selection of this 
thesis.  
Jasmina Hasanhodzic and Andrew Lo also perform a study that has gained popularity. 
They published a paper in 2007 titled “Can Hedge Fund Returns Be Replicated?: The 
Linear Case.”. By analyzing the returns of over 1600 individual hedge funds from the 
TASS Hedge fund live database they find that for certain hedge fund style categories, a 
notable part of the funds’ expected returns is due to risk premium. All funds in the 
dataset can be divided into five categories: Long/Short Equity Hedge (520), Fund of 
Funds (355), Event Driven (169), Managed Futures (114), and Emerging Markets (102). 
The categories underperforming are Event Driven and Emerging Market. For all other 
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categories, the replication works well and the clones are found to be relatively liquid 
and transparent.  
 
In the approach of Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) a time-series regression is made for each 
hedge fund to see how much of the returns are due to the common risk factors. The 
estimated regression coefficients are then used as portfolio weights for six factors. The 
factors for which each fund’s monthly returns are regressed are: the US Dollar Index 
return (USD), the return on the Lehman Corporate AA Intermediate Bond Index 
(BOND), the S&P 500 total return (S&P), the spread between the Lehman BAA 
Corporate Bond Index and the Lehman Treasury Index (CREDIT), the Goldman Sachs 
Commodity Index total return (CMDTY) and the first difference of the end of the 
month value of the CBOE Volatility Index (DVIX). The authors justify the use of these 
factors by their ability to provide risk exposures for common hedge funds. However, 
when conducting a fixed-weight linear clone, the DVIX-factor is dropped out because 
its returns are not easy to realize with liquid instruments in practice. 
 
Beside fixed-weight clone portfolios, the authors apply rolling-window approach. As a 
result, a huge gap in performance between these two approaches is found. The fixed-
weight clones are found to yield better historical performance with lower turnover 
although they are subject to look-ahead bias. The authors conclude that for certain funds 
the replication is possible and profitable. An important finding is that a proportion of 
hedge funds’ expected returns are due to the beta coefficients. Only in some occasions 
the manager specific alphas are found to be significant. Hasanhodzic and Lo are one of 
the first ones to find what they were looking for: funds’ beta exposures, the part of the 
returns that can actually be replicated. However, the performance varies largely within 
clones across the hedge fund categories and the authors point out a question: What 
really is the source of the clones’ value-added?  
 
Noël Amenc, Lionel Martellini, Jean-Christophe Meyfredi and Volker Ziemann (2010) 
extend the Hazanhodzic and Lo (2007) model considering non-linearity and conditional 
models. They apply option-based factor model, Markow regime-switching model and 
Kalman filter. Their motivation is to better capture the dynamical characteristics of the 
dynamical trading strategies the hedge funds apply. They find that selecting factors for 
each hedge fund category separately yields better out-of-sample replication quality. 
They do not find that going beyond the linear models would however accelerate the 
replication performance.  
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Three researchers, Jun Duanmu, Yongjia Li and Alexey Malakhov have recently written 
two studies about hedge fund replication with ETFs.  Due to their new approaches these 
papers are introduced. Their approach includes replication of hedge fund indices with 
futures contracts. In the first paper “In Search of Missing Risk Factors: Hedge Fund 
Return Replication with ETFs” (2014) a new factor selection methodology is applied to 
examine through all potential hedge fund risk factors. They make a separation for skill 
driven and risk driven hedge fund returns. This includes identifying hedge fund 
managers with high skills and replicating the component including the risk driven hedge 
fund return. The main idea of Duanmu et al. is to span a large set of potential risk 
factors with ETFs during a time period of 1997 to 2012. Interesting is that the number 
of U.S. listed passively managed ETFs increased from 19 to 1313 in these 15 years. The 
whole ETF industry is relatively new and explored large growth in recent years just as 
hedge funds.  
 
Duanmu et al. (2014) introduce a methodology that is based on cluster analysis and 
LAR LASSO factor selection methodology. They argue that the new linear return 
replication methodology they apply controls multicollinearity issue among ETFs and 
reduces data mining. This is important since they include all ETFs available in the data. 
By applying the out-of-sample method they find that the replication accuracy increases 
with the number of ETFs available. They demonstrate “cloneable” and “non-cloneable” 
hedge fund portfolios defined as top and bottom in-sample R2 matches. As a result, 
superior risk-adjusted performance for “non-cloneable” funds is found. This suggests 
that there are high skilled managers among managers in “non-cloneable” funds. The 
“cloneable” funds are not found to deliver any significant positive risk-adjusted 
performance. The authors conclude that there is no statistical significance of managers’ 
skills in sample of “cloneable” funds indicating that these funds can actually be 
replicated with ETFs.  
 
The authors argue that their replication method provides understanding to identify 
skilled hedge fund managers in “non-cloneable” funds. These returns are result of 
alternative risk exposures of “cloneable” funds offering liquidity and transparency. 
They also argue that the ETF returns can be used as proxies to alternative risk factors 
driving the hedge fund returns. Finally, their methodology requires several adjustments 
already when selecting the ideal ETFs and become very complex. Therefore, their 
methodology is hard for investors to adapt in practice and will not be focused in this 
thesis.  
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Another paper is written more recently by the same authors: “Smart Beta ETF 
Portfolios: Cloning Beta Active Hedge Funds” (2015). According to the authors only 
hedge funds which returns are driven by beta management risk exposures to the factors 
are possibly to clone. They call this method as replicating the beta exposures of the best 
beta active hedge funds that deliver significant long-term risk-adjusted performance. 
The methodology consists creating a portfolio of ETFs replicating risk factor exposures 
taken by top beta active hedge funds that could be cloned. In conclusion, Duanmu et al. 
combine methodologies developed in their earlier research and make and algorithm for 
creating smart beta ETF portfolios. These portfolios replicate the risk factor exposures 
taken by the best beta active hedge funds. They result with smart beta ETF portfolios 
that either match or exceed the risk-adjusted performance of their corresponding 
portfolios of hedge funds. Finally, they conclude that the smart beta ETF portfolios only 
rely on annual rebalancing. One of the reasons why Duanmu et al. (2014, 2015) take 
into account the risk factor exposure approach in their replication efforts is that some 
fund managers’ strategies are far beyond replication methods. These strategies trade 
utilizing insider tips. This means that the information cannot be replicated with any 
algorithms. Instead, the authors argue that the returns are driven by beta exposures to 
risk factors that all of the investors may not observe. 
Bollen and Fisher (2013) argue that in previous research some of the factors used are 
not investable. Instead, they use factors that are returns on liquid futures contracts. 
Relatively long sample period is chosen and it is divided into two sub periods: crisis and 
post-crisis. Ten Dow Jones Credit Suisse indices are used as target investments. The 
authors find that the clone returns have high correlations with their hedge fund targets 
meaning that the replicating is possible. The performance of the indices however varies 
substantially during the estimation period from 1994 to 2011. The broad Hedge Fund 
Index outperforms the S&P 500 with significantly lower volatility bringing annual 
Sharpe ratio of 0,73 compared to 0,37 of the S&P 500. Only three indices deliver poorer 
Sharpe ratio than the S&P 500. Given the impact of financial crisis as can be expected, 
significant variation is obtained across the sub periods. The Hedge Fund Index for 
example, delivers Sharpe ratio of -2,01 during the crisis and 1,51 after crisis.  
The procedure of Bollen and Fisher (2013) begins by taking positions in five futures. 
The returns of the futures are generated by holding nearby contract and rolling to the 
next maturity 5 days prior to expiration. Five different futures contracts are chosen due 
to their liquidity, low trading costs and coverage of the major asset classes: The U.S. 
Dollar Index contract (USD), the 10-year T-Note contract (TY), the Gold and the Crude 
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Oil contracts (GC & CL) and the S&P 500 contract (S&P).  In addition, they conduct an 
analysis with an extended set of factors, to see possible variations in the results. The 
additional set includes five more factors: monthly returns of the MSCI World Index, the 
Fama-French size and value factors (SMB and HML), the change in the 10-year 
Treasury yield (DIOYR) and the change in the credit spread (Spread).  
In spite of large data available, the authors argue that there is no data mining. Larger set 
improves the opportunity for finding better replicators and also an out-of-sample 
approach is applied. In addition, a big number of factors on a relatively short time 
period could lead to sampling errors. In order to mitigate this issue, they use a factor 
selection approach at every estimation date in order to limit the number of factors used 
to form a clone. Clone construction requires estimating the linear factor model’s 
coefficients each month. These coefficients are then used as position sizes for the set of 
factors in the linear model. The positions are entered with one-month lag and to be able 
to get the clone’s return on month t, data from time t-2 is employed. The index 
performance is typically available on the 15th of a month meaning that the mechanism 
gives two weeks time to obtain the new index returns and entering to new positions. The 
authors drop out the alpha that Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) apply. Omitting the intercept 
Bollen and Fisher focus on the factors playing bigger role fitting the targets’ returns.  
Four estimation periods (T=12, 24, 36, 48) are applied, and factor loadings are 
examined with four different sets of factors. In first set, Bollen and Fisher (2013) 
include all five futures. To look for possible unrelated factors, second set includes a 
subset of factors for each index based on the investment strategy. For example, the 
broad Hedge Fund Index utilizes again all five futures but the Convertible Arbitrage 
only the TY and the SP. In third set, an estimation regression is run on estimation date 
using all subsets of the five futures. Then, a subset that brings out the best model fit is 
selected. Fourth and the final set include a subset bringing the best fit but subsets are 
first being selected among the set of 10 factors. Estimation may bring some excess 
returns so the beta coefficients are interpreted as percentage allocation proportions of 
clone capital to corresponding futures positions. Furthermore, a negative beta is 
recognized as s short position in the futures contract.  
In-sample relation between indices and the other factors is examined through several 
regressions. The results are largely consistent with other studies. The R-squared in 
regressions varies significantly over the indices: Managed Futures Index generates R-
squared of 9,9% whereas Short Bias Index brings value of 60,3%. According to the 
authors the low level of fit should not be concerned too much because most of the 
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indices are statistically significantly related to most of the factors. Moreover, the 
relatively low fit-levels are in line with previous research. When the authors start 
dropping factors, the fit begins to decline. High average adjusted R-squared tells that the 
subsets mentioned earlier are a good addition to the replication process. Small 
improvement in fit is observed when factor subsets are selected in order to maximize 
the R-squared for the indices. When the larger 10-factors set is employed, the average 
R-square improves significantly. The fit in the in-sample examination is also improved 
when different time periods are considered. The fit is highest during the post-crisis 
period that begins in their sample in 2009. In this case, five indices generates R-squared 
over 70%. This finding is notable since it motivates to use the rolling-window approach 
in the replication research.  
As mentioned above, also an out-of-sample test is done in research of Bollen and Fisher 
(2013). A sample period from 1998 to 2011 is applied to measure the ability of clones’ 
returns to fit the index returns. During the pre-crisis 1994-2007, the clones tend to show 
underperformance whereas at time of the crisis large variation is obtained across the 
investing styles. The larger 10-factor set is used when the clones manage to outperform 
their target indices.  Better results and higher Sharpe ratios are obtained when no lag 
between the end of the estimation period and the opening of futures positions to begin 
the replication process is applied. The index returns are typically available after the 
mid-month, so the for the time without real returns the performance is conducted 
hypothetically. In most cases average returns are not statistically significantly different 
across the clones and indices but in all cases the clones have statistically significantly 
lower volatility. Therefore, the clones can be a good alternative to the indices.  
Even though the results of the paper from Bollen and Fisher (2013) are not 
overwhelming, they test whether the replication products can serve as a tool to hedge 
against systematic risk in target fund or index.  The results indicate that clones actually 
can be used for hedging market risk. One unsettle result is found in their study. In most 
cases, the correlations between the clones and the indices are lower than the correlations 
between the clones and the S&P 500. The correlations become even higher closer to the 
crisis time. This decreases the diversification opportunities for investors that are willing 
to use alternative investments. The study reveals that it is possible to match time series 
properties of hedge fund indices by estimating factor loadings with a backward-looking 
rolling-window approach. After this, portfolio weights are conducted going forward. 
The results suggest that the clones perform worse than the indices. Furthermore, since 
the indices do not show timing ability, it is not likely that the clones do either. Finally, 
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the study of Bollen and Fisher (2013) has been scrutinized. It makes strong background 
examination of related issues, but an important question is that why do the clones 
perform relatively bad. Whether it is due the methodology, factors or data chosen, this 
thesis aims to further examine these questions.    
Hayes (2012) clones six popular hedge fund indices. His main purpose is to examine 
market timing ability of the factor-based clones. He finds that the clones do not bring 
any significant market-timing alphas. The reason for the lack of market-timing alphas is 
probably due to lags caused by reporting delays that contribute to beta estimations. The 
factors he includes to his model sets are: the S&P 500 equity index (S&P), Fama-
French small minus large cap factor (SMB), Fama-French high minus low book value 
factor (HML), change in the U.S. 10-year Treasury note (USIO), Goldman Sachs 
commodity index (GSCI), U.S. dollar index (DXY), monthly change in the volatility 
index (DVIX), the Barclays Aggregate bond index (AGG) and the Barclays High Yield 
bond index (HY).  
Subhash and Enke (2014) make a similar study to Hasahodzic and Lo (2007) showing 
that the fund and factor selection may have a significant impact for the replication 
results. They extend earlier analysis by focusing on selecting the relevant factors for 
each fund strategy. In other words, the authors select three to six factors separately for 
each hedge fund strategy. With data of 1495 hedge funds from 1996 to 2008 they 
conduct both fixed-weight and rolling-window clones. The hedge funds are classified 
into eleven categories sorted by the strategies used: Event Driven, Long/Short Equity 
Hedge, Managed Futures, Fixed Income Arbitrage, Global Macro, Emerging Markets, 
Convertible Arbitrage, Multi-Strategy, Dedicated Short-Bias, Equity Market Neutral 
and Fund-of-Funds. The hedge fund data is also divided into two data sets in which the 
other one, funds with higher Sharpe ratios are identified and replicated. This results in 
clones with higher average returns compared to clones from all of the funds in each 
category. Also better risk-to-reward ratios are obtained. Finally, the authors find that 
selection of the factors depending of the underlying hedge fund strategy can have 
advantages over those constructed using a broad set of factors for each strategy. The 
approach of Subhash and Enke is not further applied in this thesis. Their method does 
not show to be easy to implement in practice. Moreover, they select the factors used in 
each strategy randomly instead choosing factors whose use would be empirically proved 
and tested. 
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Chen and Tindall (2014) replicate major Hedge Fund indices employing alternative 
methods. These methods include for example a stepwise regression, lasso method, ridge 
regression, partial least squares regression and ridge regression among several other 
advanced regressions. Their findings suggest that the best replication results are 
discovered with methods applying shrinkage of parameters. Their findings represent 
new approaches to hedge fund replication processes, however, without support from 
earlier empirical research. Therefore despite their findings this thesis rely on the linear 
factor replication methodology with Ordinary Least Squares –regression as it is more 
justified by empirical research. 
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3.2. Criticism of hedge fund replication – benefits and weaknesses 
 
Replication products may help portfolio managers in many ways: as an investable 
benchmark or an alternative asset in a portfolio (Freed 2013: 32). Some argue that 
although hedge fund clones can offer increased transparency compared to actual hedge 
funds, due to their wide geographical spread they still cannot offer same level of alphas 
than the top hedge funds. This is because they react with a lag utilizing information 
from the past returns of hedge funds. This can be called as reverse engineering. Many 
funds wait the full 45 days permitted for them to disclose their holdings and many of the 
funds may have changed their holdings from the reported ones. This may cause failures 
in the replication process since replication processes use the reported fund returns. 
 
Dor, Jagannathan and Meier (2012) examine performance of hedge fund clones as a 
group against hedge funds, and find that the reverse engineering is not even the primary 
cause for poor performance. They identify two other important drivers of tracking errors 
in the clones. First one is change in the market liquidity and the second one is biases in 
measuring returns arising due to attrition among hedge funds that have effects on 
commonly used hedge fund indices and their performance. The authors argue that 
together these two drivers account half of the variation in clones’ tracking errors over 
the time.  
 
In recent paper from O’Doherty, Savin and Tiwari (2015), the authors criticize that in 
practice, the linear replication approach suffers from high turnover rate and poor 
performance. They argue that it is difficult to identify which really are the appropriate 
factors in replication models. Secondly, they argue that those clones that are estimated 
using rolling-window portfolios and require position updating frequently, make cloning 
very costly in practice. These costs rise from high turnover of the portfolio. To address 
this issue they introduce “a model combination approach” in which they pool a set of 
diverse factor models and clone ten Dow Jones Credit Suisse indices. To choose the 
combination of factors used, they utilize a decision-theoretic framework.  
Wallerstein, Tuchschmid and Zaker (2010) examine the performance of existing hedge 
fund replication products that banks offer for their customers. According to their 
findings hedge fund replication products can deliver competitive performance to their 
benchmark hedge funds. Moreover, the products in most cases offer low-correlation 
with common market indices and therefore offer diversification opportunities. This 
already gives enough motivation to further develop the replication methods and gives 
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more motivation for new research in the future. It is not clear, however, that under 
which market conditions different methods deliver the best results. Although 
Wallerstein et al. results generally brings high returns for the clones, it must be kept in 
mind that their sample period covers only recessionary economic time when replication 
products are found to deliver higher returns and better liquidity.  
There is also critique of the hedge fund indices. Asset-class indices rely on assumption 
that the underlying assets are mainly homogenous and the dominant strategy underlying 
is the buy-and-hold strategy (Fung and Hsieh 2004: 3). In contrast, the hedge funds do 
not even need to report for the indices and the strategies are dynamic and appears as 
black boxes to investors.  
To summarize, many critics state that there are hedge fund strategies that cannot be 
broken into liquid and investable factors. Therefore, the replication works only for 
certain strategies. Secondly, as it has come up several times, the replication products are 
based on historical data and therefore they are always mimicking the funds with a lag. 
Lastly, the performance of the replicators has been relatively poor in academic research.  
To answer to the critiques, firstly, this thesis can replicate returns of the funds even with 
a historical data. Even if the hedge funds change their holdings, the replication is 
possible and it is not even any purpose for the replicators to be one-step-ahead. The 
purpose is to gain similar returns than hedge funds, no matter whether they are 
constructed from historical or future returns. The aim is to obtain whether it is still 
possible to gain similar returns with the holdings used in hedge funds. Furthermore, it is 
not obvious that the hedge funds change their holdings and strategies frequently. 
Secondly, in this thesis hedge fund indices are replicated, not individual hedge funds. 
By doing this the replication results will be for different perspective. The purpose is to 
get practical and simple results that could be utilized by any investor regardless of his or 
her skills. For this purpose, the indices are seen as more suitable targets. Also, many of 
the factors used in the model are investable. 
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4. DATA  
 
This section provides information of the data and the estimation period applied. The 
estimation period is chosen in order to conduct a comprehensive replication analysis 
and to observe possible impacts of the financial crisis. Descriptive statistics of the data 
is presented. 
 
This thesis applies ten Credit Suisse hedge fund indices as target investments. Monthly 
returns for all indices are gathered from the hedgeindex.com database that is maintained 
by the Credit Suisse Asset Management LLC (“Credit Suisse”). The dataset includes 
both the database’s flagship index the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index and individual 
strategy indices – the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Strategy Indexes. All indices are asset-
weighted portfolios of hedge funds selected on the basis of their capacity to meet a 
number of requirements: assets under management of at least $50 million, current 
audited financial statements and a minimum one-year track record (hedgeindex.com, 
2015). Instead of individual hedge funds, hedge fund indices are chosen (e.g. Fung and 
Hsieh 2004, Hayes 2012 and Bollen and Fisher 2013) due to their practical aspects. If 
hundreds of individual hedge funds were included the dataset became complex and 
would not offer the promised simplicity and practicality for the investors. As pension 
funds and other institutional institutions often invest in portfolios of funds instead of 
individual funds, is the use of indices more justified (Bollen and Fisher 2013: 82). Asset 
weighted indices are chosen instead of equal weighted indices. This is because the 
asset-weighted indices reflect the performance of the asset classes better as it represents 
the total performance of the assets invested. 
 
Certain biases can be related with selection of the data among large set of data 
available. Selection and survivorship biases are related to the fact that hedge funds are 
not obliged to report their holdings and returns to the indices. This leads to a sample of 
funds in the database that is not a true sample of funds in a real hedge fund universe. 
Survivorship bias is typical in a case in which funds stop reporting to the index and are 
finally purged from the database. These funds are typically seen as worse performance 
funds than the surviving ones and this can cause an upward skew in the remaining data. 
Instant history bias occurs when a new fund is added to the database with its past 
performance. This is often the case since reporting is voluntary and the hedge fund 
managers most likely report only the returns of the best performing funds.  
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In order to reduce the aforementioned biases Fung and Hsieh (2004) apply fund-of-
hedge fund data arguing that it is less prone to these biases. The authors claim that the 
selection bias decreases because the performance of a fund that does not report to the 
index is still reflected to the fund-of-hedge funds if these are investing to this hedge 
fund. Secondly, the survivorship bias reduces when a fund-of-hedge fund invested in a 
fund that quit its operations and its performance still remains in the historical return of 
the fund-of-hedge funds. In order to reduce the survivorship bias the Credit Suisse 
Hedge Fund Indexes -database do not remove a fund from an index before it is fully 
liquidated or fail to meet the financial reporting requirements (hedgeindex.com, 2015). 
Lastly, the instant history bias is reduced when a fund-of-hedge funds invests in a hedge 
fund and the history of the hedge fund is not included in the historical return of the 
fund-of-hedge funds. This thesis performs a study of relative performance of hedge 
fund indices versus relatively passive replicating clones. Therefore, any survivorship 
bias impacts both the index and the clone resulting unaffected relative performance. 
Finally, it should be academically possible and correct to compare the performances of 
the clones and corresponding indices.  
No hedge fund is obliged to report its holdings to the indices. The returns are reported 
only if it fits for the hedge fund’s interests. The funds may stop reporting either when 
they have sufficient capital and performance or when they suffer significant losses. 
According to Hayes (2012) the latter dominates biasing hedge fund index returns 
upwards towards “true” returns. To that extent that this bias is uncorrelated with the 
factors acting, the clones may underperform their target indices. In this thesis, also a 
broad index is included and indices are used instead of individual funds in order to 
reduce possible biases related to the data selection.  
Summary statistics for the 10 indices and the total return of the S&P 500 for 
comparison are shown in table 2. Full years are listed. Sample period is also divided 
into two sub-periods in order to obtain whether the financial crisis affects to the returns. 
All indices tend to outperform the S&P 500. The effect of the financial crisis is obvious 
for the S&P 500 as observed from panel B that includes the year 2008. The broad index 
shows high Sharpe ratios varying from 0,22 to 0,37 thus showing relatively high 
volatility in times. The other indices feature substantial variation in performance. In 
panel B, a large variation in standard deviations is obtained. Annualized average returns 
range from -15,76% for the Short Bias Index to 11,94% for the Convertible Arbitrage 
Index. One can also observe that during the financial crisis the indices generally 
performed better than the S&P500. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of the monthly returns of the 10 CS indices and the total return of the 
S&P500 are listed below. All columns presented are annualized. Data are from the full years, from 
January 2004 to December 2014. Panel A shows the full sample period. Panel B shows years from 2005 
to 2008 and panel C from 2009 to 2014. “Average” is the average of the annualized returns. Standard 
deviation “Std Dev”, skewness “Skew” and kurtosis “Kurt” are calculated for all indices. “Sharpe” is the 
Sharpe ratio defined as the average return in excess of the 3-month T-Bill rate divided by standard 
deviation. “%Neg” shows the percentage of months with a negative return.  
2005-2014 
      CS Index Average Std Dev Sharpe Skew Kurt % Neg 
Hedge Fund 6,35% 10,6%  0,30  -1,69 3,48 32% 
Convertible Arb 5,70% 19,4%  0,26  0,39 3,35 33% 
Short Bias -6,33% 16,3%  0,16  0,17 -1,65 61% 
Emerg.Market 8,29% 17,1%  0,19  -1,31 2,24 34% 
Equity Neutral 0,29% 14,9%  0,24  -2,68 7,82 31% 
Event Distr 7,25% 12,1%  0,27  -1,50 2,45 30% 
Fixed Inc Arb 4,81% 14,0%  0,31  -1,30 4,34 21% 
Global Macro 7,90% 6,4%  0,35  -0,47 0,18 28% 
Long Short 7,09% 12,0%  0,24  -1,47 1,91 36% 
Managed Fut 4,66% 9,3%  0,25  0,44 -1,38 43% 
S&P 500 9,49% 18,8%  0,01  -1,73 4,38 34% 
       2005-2008 
      CS Index Average Std Dev Sharpe Skew Kurt % Neg 
Hedge Fund 3,74% 15,4% 0,22 -1,82 3,34 33% 
Convertible Arb -3,66% 19,8% 0,20 -1,30 1,93 44% 
Short Bias 7,82% 10,7% 0,23 -1,02 -0,19 48% 
Emerg.Market 6,92% 24,9% 0,13 -1,98 3,93 31% 
Equity Neutral -3,44% 24,7% 0,15 -1,96 3,86 17% 
Event Distr 3,80% 16,5% 0,23 -1,81 3,38 31% 
Fixed Inc Arb -3,93% 16,9% 0,25 -1,77 3,30 38% 
Global Macro 8,89% 9,6% 0,24 -1,32 1,80 25% 
Long Short 4,49% 16,3% 0,20 -1,91 3,66 38% 
Managed Fut 8,07% 7,7% 0,29 0,78 1,51 42% 
S&P 500 -2,70% 23,4% 0,01 -1,72 3,26 40% 
       2009-2014 
      CS Index Average Std Dev Sharpe Skew Kurt % Neg 
Hedge Fund 8,09% 7,1% 0,37 -0,07 0,82 31% 
Convertible Arb 11,94% 17,9% 0,32 2,10 4,71 26% 
Short Bias -15,76% 12,0% 0,12 1,14 -0,39 69% 
Emerg.Market 9,21% 12,3% 0,26 0,74 1,66 36% 
Equity Neutral 2,78% 4,0% 0,54 0,79 -0,04 40% 
Event Distr 9,56% 9,1% 0,30 -0,47 -0,48 29% 
Fixed Inc Arb 10,63% 9,0% 0,37 1,62 2,68 10% 
Global Macro 7,24% 4,3% 0,45 0,80 -1,44 29% 
Long Short 8,81% 9,6% 0,27 -0,78 0,81 35% 
Managed Fut 2,39% 10,3% 0,23 1,04 -0,96 44% 
S&P 500 17,62% 10,6% 0,01 0,03 -0,04 31% 
! 33 
Factor data are gathered from Thomson Reuters Datastream database through 
University of Vaasa. All factors are chosen inspired by prior academic research and 
existing commercial clone products. The model employed in this thesis is similar to the 
updated Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model on David A. Hsieh web site 
(faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7, 2015). The updated model includes three trend-
following factors that are excess returns on trend following factors constructed of look-
back straddles on futures contracts of bonds, commodities and currencies. Instead of 
their bond, commodity and currency trend-following factors, factors that are easier to 
implement in practice are applied in this thesis. As Fung and Hsieh, this thesis adds two 
equity- and two bond-oriented risk factors in the model. Furthermore, as in Fung and 
Hsieh updated model also this thesis introduces a relatively new factor to be 
implemented in replication models: the emerging market risk factor.  
 
The trend-following factors applied by Fung and Hsieh are not relevant in practice. The 
use of those factors would require trading of derivative securities and therefore this 
thesis criticizes the use them in the replication process. They may be relevant when 
describing the assets that hedge funds use, but in the concept of replication they make 
the replication models unpractical and therefore are not further applied in the concept of 
this thesis.  
The aim of this thesis is to keep the replication procedure achievable in practice. 
Therefore the factors in the model employed are relatively easy to realize through liquid 
instruments. For example, the USD, the S&P 500 and the BOND factors can be realized 
through using forward contracts. Also, there are futures contracts for components of the 
commodity index (Hasanhodzic and Lo 2007: 14). Hayes (2012: 12) argues that one 
should only use factors that are liquid and easy to implement. By adding some spreads 
into the model, he argues that one can also decrease multicollinearity. This is because 
several equity factors can be highly correlated with each other. Therefore, spreads are 
added into the model. Bollen and Fisher (2012: 8) bring up the issue with choosing 
factors such as the S&P 500 when one goal for investors is to gain diversification. First 
reason to include also factors of standard asset classes is the possible match between 
these factors and the target. Whether there is correlation between the target and standard 
assets then the clone will inherit these features. Second reason is that although the 
whole clone portfolio was built of factors representing standard asset classes, the 
rolling-window approach would allow the time-varying exposures and still could result 
a clone delivering low correlation with a buy-and-hold investment in stocks and bonds.  
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Monthly descriptive statistics of the factor returns are presented in table 3 on the next 
page. The time period covers the whole sample period from September 2004 to 
September 2015. These returns are not annualized as the returns in table 2. The monthly 
average returns between the factors vary from -0,27% for Commodity to 1,25% for 
Credit. Standard deviations vary from 1,15% for the Bond to 9,75% for the Size-spread. 
According to Jarque-bera tests for normality, all of the variables except two of them 
follow normal distribution. The Size-Spread and USD factors are non-normal. Breusch-
Pagan test is run in case of heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity exists in almost all of 
the variables at 1% level. Only the Size-Spread shows no heteroscedasticity.  
The raw returns for the factors are presented in figure 2 on page 36. For the Commodity 
factor, the returns have radically come down although its returns have been the highest 
among the factors before the turn of the year from 2014 to 2015 when the S&P 500 
passed it. The effect of the financial crisis at the end of 2008 can be obtained as a drop 
in returns in case of all the factors. One can also easily obtain that the overall return for 
the S&P 500, MSCI Index and Size-Spread has increased from 2004 to 2015. Also the 
Credit and USD factors show positive returns, but the variation in returns is small. The 
average monthly changes in the returns are shown in appendix 1, separately for each 
factor.  
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Figure 2.  Monthly raw returns of the eight factors. !
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5. METHODOLOGY 
 
This thesis examines the performance of the clones constructed using a linear factor 
model with eight different factors. These factors are selected based on their economic 
relevance and prior academic research. Both a passive model with constant portfolio 
weights and an active model with frequent rebalancing of the weights are constructed. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first part includes an introduction 
to the risk exposure analysis and the statistical estimation method used. After finding 
the risk exposures for the factors, they are used for building the replicators. Lastly, the 
theory is given to compare the performance of the replicators with their benchmarks in 
terms of risk and return.  All results are given in the next chapter. 
 
5.1. Hedge fund risk exposure analysis  
First step in the replication process is to find out how much of the hedge funds 
expected return is due to risk exposures to identified factors, therefore the name “risk 
exposure analysis”. The goal of the statistical estimation procedure is to estimate the 
monthly beta coefficients for the factors in the regression model. Further, there are two 
different methods to perform this analysis: the fixed-weight and rolling-window 
multiple regressions. The first method includes fixed-weight portfolios where the entire 
sample history of fund or index and factor returns are used to estimate the portfolio 
weights whereas the rolling-window approach uses returns of a specified period and 
yields true out-of-sample results. The both methods have their limitations. The fixed 
weight method may suffer of a look-ahead bias whereas rolling window approach 
regularly requires rebalancing. Rolling-window estimators can also be subject to larger 
estimation errors because of a smaller sample size (Hasanhodzic and Lo 2007: 22). In 
practice the first method is suitable for passive investors whereas the rolling-window 
estimation method may fit better for investors who are more active and willing to 
conduct the monthly rebalancing. 
A rolling analysis of time series is claimed to assess the model´s stability over time. 
Because the economic environment changes over time it is not reasonable to assume 
that the parameters would stay constant either. Therefore, the rolling-window estimation 
procedure is applied. If the parameters are constant over time then the rolling-window 
estimates should not differ too much from the fixed-weight ones. However if the 
parameters change during the sample period, the rolling estimates should be able to 
capture the instability. (Zivot and Tang 2006: 313.)  
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Among several methods to perform the estimation analysis, an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression method is applied. OLS is best fitted for estimating linear 
relationships, such as factor exposures (Bruno and Whitelaw 2012: 44). Simple rolling-
window regressions are performed by the add-in functions of the statistical software 
used. 
The model applied is a unique version of factors presented in previous studies. 
However, no study has earlier applied exactly this combination of the factors. In 
addition, the Emerging Market Index factor is a relatively new component in the 
replication models. Since the results of factors presented in prior research are not in line 
and do not conclude any factor combination to perform best, this thesis has really no 
earlier guidelines it should follow in the factor selection process. However, as even the 
largest banks have already utilized findings of Fung and Hsieh, the replication model of 
this thesis is largely build on their original model. The multiple regression model of this 
thesis consists of eight different common factors. The linear eight-factor model is:  
 
(4) !! = (!!)+ !!!!"500! + !!!!"! + !!!!"#$– !"#$%&! + !!!!"#$%&! + !!!!"#$!+ !!!!"##"$%&'! + !!!10!"#$! + !!!!"#! 
 
 
The multiple regression’s eight factors are: (1) SP500: the S&P 500 index total return, 
(2) EM: the MSCI Emerging Markets Index total return, (3) Size-Spread: the Russell 
2000 index total return minus the S&P500 total return, (4) Credit: the difference 
between the Barclay’s U.S. Baa Intermediate Corporate bonds and the Barclay’s U.S. 3-
5 year treasury index, (5) Bond: the return on the Barclay’s intermediate corporate bond 
(AA) index, (6) Commodity: the return of the S&P GCSI Commodity index, (7) 10Year: 
the change in the 10-year U.S. treasury benchmark bond and (8) USD: the U.S. Dollar 
index return. All returns are monthly total returns, except the U.S. Dollar return that is a 
price index for data availability reasons. However, using a price index in case of the 
Dollar return will most likely not disturb the results. Monthly return of the 3-month 
U.S. Treasury bill is used as a risk-free rate. These factors are chosen due to their ability 
to correspond to a large set of risk exposures to hedge funds; stocks, bonds, 
commodities, currencies, etc.  
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5.2. Building the replicator 
 
After the factor exposures are known, they are used as portfolio weights for the eight 
factors in order to examine how much of the index’ return is due to risk premiums of 
identified factors. The model describing how the estimates are used to construct returns 
for the replication products (!!"∗) can be written as: 
 
(5) !!"∗ = !!"!∗ !"500! + !!"!∗ !"! + !!"!∗ !"#$– !"#$%&! + !!"!∗ !"#$%&! + !!"!∗ !"#$!+ !!"!∗ !"##"$%&'! + !!"!∗ 10!"#$! + !!"!∗ !"#! + !!" 
 !!! +⋯+ !!!! = 1 
 
This regression is performed to each hedge fund index in the sample. It simply includes 
multiplying the estimated beta coefficients with monthly variable returns in order to 
achieve monthly clone returns. Possible support for the hypothesis is obtained through 
the regression models (4), (5) and (6). Model (6) for the rolling approach is introduced 
in the next chapter. The results are dependent on the beta exposures obtained through 
model (4) together with the factor returns in model (5). After, the clone results are 
compared against the targets and therefore, the return characteristics of the hedge fund 
indices play a big role when conducting the final results.  
 
As in the research of Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007), the constant term is omitted to obtain 
the best average of the factors that can explain the most of the index returns. By doing 
this the OLS regression constrains the factor means to fit the means of the index. In 
addition the coefficients are constrained to equal one so that they yield true portfolio 
weights. Negative coefficients are allowed because some of the factors in the model can 
be sold short and it can be even required to achieve the right risk exposures the hedge 
funds of the indices exhibit. According to Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007), for example a 
clone of the Short Bias index will require shorting of the S&P 500. This is in line with 
the results of this thesis as proven later. Moreover, when negative coefficients are 
allowed, as well as time varying factor exposures, the results may give products with 
very low correlation with for example, the buy-and-hold investments in stocks and 
bonds (Bollen and Fisher 2013: 84).  
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5.3. Measuring clone performance 
 
After the estimated factor exposures are employed as portfolio weights for the 
replicating portfolios, the results of the conducted replication products are analyzed. In 
order to outline the performance of the replication products, their return characteristics 
are analyzed and compared against the same characteristics of the underlying hedge 
fund indices. The performance is analyzed with return component (raw- and risk 
adjusted) and volatility. Return is examined with the average annual return and the 
annual standard deviation is used as a metric for the volatility. Sharpe ratio is used as a 
measure for the risk-adjusted return.  
 
Beside the clones’ expected return characteristics, portfolios’ correlation with major 
market indices such as the S&P 500 is another characteristic that concerns the hedge 
fund investors. Investors are expecting to achieve diversification benefits that 
alternative investments have traditionally provided. Therefore, regression results 
concerning the correlation with the S&P 500 are provided. The replication quality is 
analyzed by regressing correlations between the clones and corresponding indices. The 
results are presented in the next chapter. 
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6. RESULTS 
 
This chapter largely follows same structure as the methodology section. First the results 
of the risk exposure analysis are given followed by the clone construction. The section 
concludes with an analysis of the replicators’ performance.  
 
6.1. Risk exposure analysis 
Risk exposure analysis examines how much of a hedge fund index returns are due to 
risk premiums of identified factors. Table 4 on the next page presents summary 
statistics for the beta coefficients or factor exposures in Eq. (4) estimated for each 10 
indices. Note that the coefficients are constrained sum to one and the intercept is 
omitted. Figure 3 (page 43) represents the factor exposures of regressions in which the 
coefficients are constrained to sum to one and intercept dropped. For comparison, a 
figure with unconstrained coefficients and included intercept is presented (figure 4 on 
page 43). The figures show that it is possible to find risk exposures for the hedge fund 
indices and try to clone them constructing a portfolio based on these exposures. 
Therefore separate regressions with unconstrained beta coefficients are not performed 
for each index and results with constrained betas are conducted immediately. This is 
due to the fact that it is confirmed in previous research (e.g. Hasanhodzic and Lo, 2007) 
that it is possible to clone at least part of the hedge fund or hedge fund index returns.  
The results of the figures are parallel and similar to Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) with 
exception of the manager specific alphas. They get significantly larger exposures to 
alphas. However, compared to those factor exposures that also Hasanhodzic and Lo 
(2007) includes in their model the exposures are similar. When no coefficients are 
constrained the Short Bias has an average S&P 500 beta of -0,507, which is consistent 
with an approach to sell short. In contrast, the Equity Neutral has an average S&P 500 
beta of 0,017, which is consistent with their market neutrality. When the coefficients are 
constrained to sum one, larger variation is obtained for the Equity Neutral index. On 
average, the risk exposures do vary considerably across the indices. The adjusted R-
squared mean is relatively high, 0,52. This means that the model can explain 52% of the 
returns of underlying hedge fund indices. Finally, the multivariate regressions results 
suggest that by the linear clones it is possible to replicate part of the risk exposures of 
hedge funds. The Broad Hedge Fund Index and the Convertible Arbitrage Index have 
even six out eight factors that are statistically significant at least at 10% level.  
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Table 4. Results for the multivariate linear regressions of the monthly index returns 
from the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund database from September 2004 to September 2015 
on eight factors: (1) SP500: the S&P 500 index total return, (2) EM: the MSCI 
Emerging Markets index total return, (3) Size-Spread: the Russell 2000 index total 
return minus the S&P 500 total return, (4) Credit: the difference between the Barclay’s 
U.S. Baa Intermediate Corporate bonds and the Barclay’s U.S. 3-5 year treasury index, 
(5) Bond: the return on the Barclay’s intermediate corporate bond (AA) index, (6) 
Commodity: the return of the S&P GCSI Commodity index, (7) 10Year: the change in 
the 10-year U.S. treasury benchmark bond, and (8) USD: the U.S. Dollar index return. 
“***”, “**”, and “*” indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CS Index S&P500 MSCI Size-Spread Credit Bond Commodity 10Year USD 
Hedge fund 0,077** 0,12*** -0,008 0,06*** 0,53*** 0,05*** 0,05*** 0,11*** 
Convertible Arb 0,03 0,12*** -0,02 0,05* 0,66*** 0,05* 0,08*** 0,04 
Short Bias -0,49*** -0,11* -0,17*** 0,11** 1,25*** 0,08* 0,06* 0,27*** 
Emerg. Market -0,05 0,34*** -0,02 0,09*** 0,50*** 0,04** 0,05*** 0,05 
Equity Neutral 0,04 -0,06 0,05 0,22*** 0,60*** 0,07 0,14*** -0,05 
Event Distr. 0,09** 0,06*** -0,005 0,10*** 0,52*** 0,04*** 0,09*** 0,10** 
Fixed Inc Arb 0,08 0,05 -0,02 0,10*** 0,60*** 0,07*** 0,04** 0,08 
Global Macro -0,007 0,09*** -0,03* 0,04** 0,69*** 0,06*** 0,01 0,14** 
Long/Short 0,16*** 0,15*** 0,006 0,03 0,49*** 0,04** 0,07*** 0,06 
Managed Fut 0,14 0,05 -0,02 -0,002 0,58*** 0,04 -0,06*** 0,28** 
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!
Figure 3. Average regression coefficients for the multivariate linear regressions of 
monthly returns of the Hedge Fund Indices from September 2004 to September 2015 on 
eight factors. The regression coefficients are constrained to sum to one. 
 
Figure 4. Average regression coefficients for the multivariate linear regressions of 
monthly returns of the Hedge Fund Indices from September 2004 to September 2015 on 
eight factors and the intercept. Regression coefficients are unconstrained. 
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6.2. Linear clones 
 
The multivariate regression results in previous section suggest that it is possible to 
replicate at least part of the hedge fund returns. This supports the hypothesis. In this 
section the replication procedure is brought further, by considering two types of clones. 
The first type consists of fixed weight portfolios, where the whole sample of index and 
factor returns is used in the regressions. The portfolio weights are fixed through time, 
hence the term fixed-weight. As discussed earlier, these clones have their limitations 
and therefore also another type of clones are constructed. The second type of the linear 
clones allows time varying in the returns and is constructed using the rolling-window 
regressions. 
 
6.2.1. Fixed-weight clones 
 
In order to construct a fixed-weight clone for index i, its returns {Rit } are first 
regressed on eight factors introduced in chapter 4. The intercept is dropped and the beta 
coefficients are constrained to sum to one. The regression model (4) is introduced on 
page 38. In order to construct the clone returns the estimated regression coefficients 
{β∗ik} are then used as portfolio weights for the eight factors as described in model (5) 
on page 39. The expected return decomposition for the linear clones is presented in 
table 5 (pages 45 and 46).  Each row in the panels shows the average mean return for 
the index clone and the averages of the percentage contributions of each of the eight 
factors to that to the total mean return. Note that in each row the average percentage 
contribution adds up to 100% when summed across the eight factors. Significances of 
the estimated beta coefficients are added into the tables to facilitate the interpretation. 
 
The first row in panel A indicates that during the whole estimation period the most 
significant contributors to the average monthly return of 0,21% for the Broad Hedge 
Fund Index are the Bond (53,42%) and MSCI (11,53%). From panel C one can obtain 
that the monthly average returns are significantly lower than in panel A and panel B. 
This confirms that the financial crisis has affected the clone returns. Another question is 
that whether these returns are, however, higher than the returns of the original indices. 
Noticeably, most of the factors are statistically significant at 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
Moreover, the adjusted R-squares are relatively high: 51,4% for the whole sample 
period, 48,4% for the pre-crisis period and 59,72% for the post-crisis period. 
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6.2.2. 24-month rolling-window clones !
To construct the second types of clones for each month t, a 24-month rolling-window 
method is applied. All results are out-of-sample. The coefficient estimates are 
constructed from month t-24 to t-1with similar regression as before:  
 
(6) !!"!! = !!!"!"500!!! + !!!"!"!!! + !!!"!"#$– !"#$%&!!! + !!!"!"#$%&!!!+ !!!"!"#$!!! + !!!"!"##"$%&'!!! + !!!"10!"#$!!! + !!!"!"#!!!+ !!"!! 
 ! = 1,… ,24 
 
The estimated regression coefficients {β∗ik} are then used as portfolio weights for the 
eight factors. Here the coefficients are indexed by both i and t, because the regression is 
repeated every month for each index. Indexation by time t reflects the fact that the 
coefficients are computed by the rolling-window method. An example of the monthly 
return decompositions is presented in the appendices (see appendix 2). The example is 
given for the Broad Hedge Fund Index.  Note that the data in the rolling-window clones 
begins already in 2002, in order to conduct the first clones in September 2004. Also, at 
the time this thesis is being done, there is yet no data available for the Credit Suisse 
Hedge Fund Indices for October 2015 and therefore the regression coefficients are 
estimated until August 2015 for the rolling-window clones. In summary tables the data 
for the corresponding indices is also given until the August 2015.  
 
The choice between the two types of the clones depends of the investor. A passive 
investor with little interest or expertise may prefer the fixed-weight linear clones 
whereas an active investor with more capabilities relies on using the rolling-window 
clones (Hasanhodzic and Lo 2007: 22). For these reasons, both the fixed-weight and 
rolling-window linear clones are considered and both of their results are compared to 
their benchmarks in the next section. 
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6.3. Performance results !
In this section, an analysis of the performance and quality is given. The performance is 
first analyzed by examining the return component of both the fixed-weight and rolling-
window clones and those are compared to the underlying indices. The return component 
is analyzed by calculating the annual mean return, annual mean standard deviation and 
annual Sharpe ratio. Standard deviation gives a demonstration of the annual volatility 
and Sharpe ratio describes the risk-adjusted return component. The Sharpe ratio can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
(7)    !ℎ!"#$!!"#$% = !!! ""#!$!!!!!!""#!$  
 
Where !!!!""#!$! is annual mean portfolio return and !! is the risk-free rate. Monthly 
return of the 3-month U.S. Treasury bill is used as the risk-free rate. The annual excess 
return is then divided by the annual standard deviation in order to find the risk adjusted 
return component. The higher the ratio, the more attractive the investment can be kept. 
The results are presented in tables 6 and 7 on pages 49 and 51. 
 
During the estimation period from September 2004 to September 2015 only one 
category of the fixed-weight clones generates higher annual mean return compared to 
the underlying index. This clone is the Equity Neutral that yields 2,98% annual mean 
return compared to 0,52% for the Equity Neutral hedge fund index. As shown earlier in 
tables 4 and 5, three out of eight factors in the clone are statistically significant. 
Therefore, the conclusion is not that the clone necessarily outperforms the target index. 
In addition, the Sharpe ratio of the clone, 0,72 is significantly lower than that of the 
index: 2,35.  
 
During the post-crisis period from September 2008 to September 2015 (panel C) again 
the Equity Neutral clone generates higher returns than the index (-2,60% vs -2,97%). 
This result is again not statistically significant because only one out of eight factors 
showed statistical significance earlier in the factor exposure analysis.  
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Table 6. Annual mean return, standard deviation and Sharpe ratio for the fixed-weight linear 
clones and the target indices. Panel A presents results for the whole estimation period, panel B 
for the Pre-crisis and panel C for the Post-crisis period.  
 
Panel A. September 2004-September 2015 
 
   
 
Fixed-weight linear clone CS Hedge fund index  
  Annual mean return 
Annual mean 
Stdev 
Annual mean 
Sharpe 
Annual mean 
return 
Annual mean 
Stdev 
Annual mean 
Sharpe 
Hedge fund 2,50 % 0,56 % 0,55 5,80 % 9,79 % 2,73 
Convertible Arb 1,55 % 0,55 % 0,22 4,98 % 17,59 % 2,53 
Short Bias -6,23 % 1,73 % -2,49 -5,98 % 15,56 % 1,46 
Emerging market 4,05 % 1,40 % 1,09 7,42 % 15,80 % 1,81 
Equity Neutral 2,98 % 1,23 % 0,72 0,52 % 13,49 % 2,35 
Event Distressed 2,54 % 0,58 % 0,56 6,40 % 11,35 % 2,56 
Fixed Income Arb 2,17 % 0,62 % 0,44 4,23 % 12,78 % 3,08 
Global Macro 0,93 % 0,49 % 0,00 6,87 % 6,37 % 3,26 
Long/Short 3,19 % 0,68 % 0,79 6,90 % 11,03 % 2,32 
Managed Futures 1,50 % 0,49 % 0,20 5,05 % 8,98 % 2,26 
 
Panel B. September 2004-August 2008 
(Pre-crisis) 
   
 
Fixed-weight linear clone CS Hedge fund index  
  Annual mean return 
Annual mean 
Stdev 
Annual mean 
Sharpe 
Annual mean 
return 
Annual mean 
Stdev 
Annual mean 
Sharpe 
Hedge fund 3,42 % 1,24 % 0,15 7,44 % 6,87 % 3,19 
Convertible Arb 0,84 % 0,82 % -0,29 2,03 % 8,45 % 4,15 
Short Bias -13,22 % 2,38 % -2,66 2,22 % 13,07 % 2,44 
Emerging market 8,79 % 3,42 % 1,06 11,43 % 12,85 % 2,11 
Equity Neutral -1,72 % 0,62 % -0,72 6,27 % 3,99 % 4,92 
Event Distressed 2,34 % 0,82 % -0,03 7,92 % 7,34 % 3,85 
Fixed Income Arb -0,64 % 0,70 % -0,54 2,01 % 5,01 % 6,05 
Global Macro -0,09 % 1,60 % -0,45 9,79 % 5,72 % 3,33 
Long/Short 6,60 % 1,64 % 0,68 8,35 % 8,25 % 3,10 
Managed Futures 2,50 % 1,59 % -0,01 7,03 % 5,01 % 3,21 
 
Panel C. September 2008-September 2015 
(Post-crisis) 
   
 
Fixed-weight linear clone CS Hedge fund index  
  Annual mean return 
Annual mean 
Stdev 
Annual mean 
Sharpe 
Annual mean 
return 
Annual mean 
Stdev 
Annual mean 
Sharpe 
Hedge fund -4,12 % 2,63 % -0,79 3,98 % 10,52 % 3,05 
Convertible Arb -6,70 % 2,72 % -1,28 5,94 % 20,12 % 2,53 
Short Bias -20,39 % 6,11 % -3,90 -10,41 % 14,22 % 1,08 
Emerging market -3,85 % 2,35 % -0,74 3,71 % 15,45 % 2,05 
Equity Neutral -2,60 % 3,06 % -0,50 -2,97 % 16,18 % 1,37 
Event Distressed -3,39 % 2,41 % -0,65 4,57 % 12,56 % 2,48 
Fixed Income Arb -3,83 % 2,42 % -0,73 4,92 % 14,71 % 2,66 
Global Macro -5,91 % 3,00 % -1,13 4,24 % 7,00 % 3,94 
Long/Short -4,37 % 2,90 % -0,84 5,02 % 11,64 % 2,47 
Managed Futures -3,78 % 3,41 % -0,72 3,09 % 9,19 % 1,97 
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From panel B it is obtained that no clone manages to generate higher average returns 
than the target. The conclusion is that the fixed-weight linear clones do not outperform 
their target indices in any of the three estimation periods. However in some cases the 
clone return is only slightly lower than the returns of the index: the Short Bias (-6,23% 
vs -5,98%) in panel A. Again, some of the clones stay far away from their counterparts: 
the Short Bias (-13,22% vs 2,22%) in panel B.  
 
All annual standard deviations are notably lower for the fixed-weight clones than for the 
underlying indices. This suggests that the clones tend to be less volatile than their 
counterparties. For example, the annual mean standard deviation for the Convertible 
Arbitrage clone in panel C is 2,72% whereas the same parameter for the index is 
20,12%. The results are different from the rolling-window linear clones (table 7 on page 
51). Annual mean standard deviations of the clones, on average are very close to those 
of the targets. Some of the values are even higher, for example the Hedge Fund (13,47% 
vs 9,72%), Long/Short (14,56% vs 10,99%) and Managed Futures (21,63% vs 9,15%). 
 
In seven out of ten cases the linear 24-month rolling-window clone outperforms the 
index during the post-crisis period from September 2008 to August 2015 measured by 
annual returns. This is in line with Wallerstein et al. (2010, 2012) who find that the 
clones do better in economic downturn than the actual hedge funds. On the other hand, 
the annual Sharpe ratios of the clones are notably lower compared to the underlying 
indices. Also Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007:23) find that the clone Sharpe values are 
generally lower than those of the target funds. 
 
There are three clone-types that yield higher average annual returns than the actual 
indices during the whole estimation period from 2004 to 2015: the Hedge Fund (6,10% 
vs 5,92%), the Long/Short (7,75% vs 6,99%) and the Managed Futures (16,30% vs 
4,82%). In panel B, during the pre-crisis period, no clone yields higher average returns 
than the actual hedge fund index. The clone returns are rather far behind from the index 
returns: the Convertible Arbitrage (-5,03% vs 2,03%), Emerging Market (3,74 vs 
11,43%), Event Distressed (-0,36% vs 7,92%). Nevertheless, these results suggest that 
for certain hedge fund index categories the performance of the rolling-window clones 
may be comparable to that of the corresponding indices. Although the results would not 
be revolutionizing in terms of the clones’ performance, these findings may still offer 
value for the future research. 
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Table 7. Annual mean return, standard deviation and Sharpe ratio for the 24-month rolling-
window linear clones and the target indices. Panels present different estimation periods.  
 
Panel A. September 2004-August 2015 
 
    
 24-month Rolling-window linear clone  CS Hedge fund index  
 
!!
Annual mean 
return 
Annual mean 
Stdev 
Annual mean 
Sharpe 
Annual mean 
return 
Annual mean 
Stdev 
Annual mean 
Sharpe 
Hedge fund 6,10 % 13,47 % 1,28 5,92 % 9,72 % 2,76 
Convertible Arb 0,79 % 15,91 % 0,08 5,00 % 17,59 % 2,52 
Short Bias -7,09 % 13,65 % -0,53 -6,39 % 15,25 % 1,48 
Emerging market 7,28 % 16,91 % 1,07 7,49 % 15,75 % 1,82 
Equity Neutral -2,32 % 14,61 % 0,41 0,47 % 13,49 % 2,36 
Event Distressed 4,73 % 14,97 % 0,90 6,52 % 11,25 % 2,60 
Fixed Income Arb 2,76 % 12,03 % 0,74 4,26 % 12,76 % 3,08 
Global Macro 4,98 % 9,40 % 0,91 7,00 % 6,22 % 3,33 
Long/Short 7,75 % 14,56 % 1,56 6,99 % 10,99 % 2,31 
Managed Futures 16,30 % 21,63 % 1,00 4,82 % 9,15 % 2,24 
 
Panel B. September 2004-August 2008  
(Pre-crisis) 
    
 24-month Rolling-window linear clone  CS Hedge fund index  
 
!!
Annual mean 
return 
Annual mean 
Stdev 
Annual mean 
Sharpe 
Annual mean 
return 
Annual mean 
Stdev 
Annual mean 
Sharpe 
Hedge fund 2,28 % 6,71 % 1,12 7,44 % 6,87 % 3,19 
Convertible Arb -5,03 % 4,51 % -0,83 2,03 % 8,45 % 4,15 
Short Bias -4,78 % 13,04 % -0,56 2,22 % 13,07 % 2,44 
Emerging market 3,74 % 10,18 % 0,94 11,43 % 12,85 % 2,11 
Equity Neutral 0,51 % 3,09 % 0,43 6,27 % 3,99 % 4,92 
Event Distressed -0,36 % 7,03 % 0,30 7,92 % 7,34 % 3,85 
Fixed Income Arb 0,80 % 6,15 % 0,26 2,01 % 5,01 % 6,05 
Global Macro 1,49 % 2,79 % 0,55 9,79 % 5,72 % 3,33 
Long/Short 5,38 % 8,94 % 1,80 8,35 % 8,25 % 3,10 
Managed Futures 5,20 % 4,33 % 0,61 7,03 % 5,01 % 3,21 
 
Panel C. September 2008-August 2015 
(Post-crisis) 
    
 24-month Rolling-window linear clone  CS Hedge fund index  
 
!!
Annual mean 
return 
Annual mean 
Stdev 
Annual mean 
Sharpe 
Annual mean 
return 
Annual mean 
Stdev 
Annual mean 
Sharpe 
Hedge fund 7,51 % 14,79 % 0,90 4,16 % 10,44 % 3,11 
Convertible Arb 3,96 % 17,23 % 0,26 5,98 % 20,11 % 2,52 
Short Bias -7,66 % 14,09 % -0,43 -11,02 % 13,45 % 1,09 
Emerging market 8,15 % 18,28 % 0,73 3,81 % 15,41 % 2,08 
Equity Neutral -3,98 % 17,26 % 0,21 -3,05 % 16,16 % 1,38 
Event Distressed 7,04 % 16,17 % 0,83 4,74 % 12,45 % 2,53 
Fixed Income Arb 3,40 % 12,94 % 0,67 4,98 % 14,69 % 2,66 
Global Macro 6,49 % 10,90 % 0,91 4,44 % 6,87 % 4,08 
Long/Short 8,04 % 16,06 % 0,86 5,16 % 11,61 % 2,46 
Managed Futures 21,20 % 25,43 % 1,14 2,74 % 9,37 % 1,95 
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Next figures (5-14) display the comparison of the Credit Suisse Indices and their 
rolling-window clones: the monthly average return for the index and clone. Each figure 
displays also the monthly average p-value for the clone. The p-values indicate statistical 
significance for the computed rolling-window beta coefficients that are further 
multiplied with the monthly factor returns in order to gauge the monthly clone returns. 
As it can be observed from the figures, the p-values are generally high among the 
clones. This is in contrast with the fixed-weight coefficients that showed well higher 
statistical significance. The left axis in the figures shows the average monthly return-% 
whereas the right axis shows the average p-value for the replication products.  
 
Figure 5. Monthly returns of the Broad Hedge Fund Index and the Hedge Fund clone 
and the Hedge Fund clone’s average monthly p-value during September 2004 and 
August 2015.  
 
The average monthly p-values for the Hedge Fund clone are very high (figure 5 above). 
This means that the clone returns are statistically insignificant. The figure shows a 
notable drop in both index and clone returns in September 2008 as expected due to the 
financial crisis. On average the index and the clone returns follow the same pattern 
index returns being slightly higher. From the beginning of 2011 almost till the end of 
2014 the clone shows higher average monthly returns, thus insignificant. According to 
the low performance and insignificant coefficient values, the conclusion is that the 
Hedge Fund clone does not outperform the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index in any of 
the sample periods. In case of the Hedge Fund category, the hypothesis is not confirmed 
in terms of the clone performance. 
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Figures 6 (above), 7 (middle) and 8 (below).  Monthly returns for the Convertible 
Arbitrage, Short Bias and Emerging Market Indices and their clones. Also clones’ 
average monthly p-values are presented. Data are from September 2004 to August 2015. 
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As obtained from figure 6, the p-values for the Convertible Arbitrage clone are highly 
statistical insignificant. The p-value patterns of the Short Bias and the Emerging Market 
clones touches the 0,1-level indicating significance at 10% level however not clearly 
demonstrating statistical significance for the estimates. The returns of these three 
indices and their clones largely follow similar patterns the index showing higher returns 
in times and the opposite. For the Emerging Market clone there is a longer period from 
early 2011 to late 2014 when it seems to generate higher returns. Interestingly, in all 
other categories, the index and the clone returns start to decline in August-September 
2008, but the Short Bias category shows returns falling much later. As shown in figure 
7, the returns drop just a little, showing a sharp peak upwards straight after in October-
November 2008. The real drop in the returns comes later in early 2009 and lasts about 
three months from March to June. Thus, the p-values are very high at that time showing 
value over 0,4. 
 
Below is shown a figure for the Equity Neutral category and on the next page a figure 
for the Event Driven category. Event Driven clone (figure 10) has significant 
coefficients at 10%-level from May 2005 to January 2007 and from September 2008 to 
November 2011. However during these years the clone generates lower returns than the 
target index and therefore does not outperform the index. In times the Equity Neutral 
index (figure 9 below) generates higher returns than the index, but these values are not 
statistically significant. A drop after the crisis is very deep, normally almost flat curve 
dramatically drops and exhibits -40,45% downturn in the returns.  
 
Figure 9. Monthly returns for the Equity Neutral Index and its clone. Also clone’s 
average monthly p-values are presented. Data are from September 2004 to August 2015. 
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Figure 10. Monthly returns for the Event Driven Distressed Index and its clone. Also 
clone’s average monthly p-values are presented. Data are from September 2004 to 
August 2015. 
 
P-values for the Fixed Income Arbitrage, Global Macro and Long/Short strategies are 
not overwhelming (figures 11-13 on page 56). The Fixed Income Arbitrage clone 
(figure 11) shows statistical significance in the very beginning of the estimation period 
but the clone returns do not tend to be higher than the index returns. In 2008 the drop in 
the return pattern is well noticed: normally flat returns exhibit almost -14% downturn. 
The Long/Short index clone has two times statistically significant average monthly 
returns: from April to July 2005 and in June 2012 when the p-value is exactly 0,1 
indicating statistical significance at 10%-level. Also in 2005 the significance is obtained 
at 10%-level. What is important is that in both times the clone return is higher than that 
of the index. This means that during some months, the Long/Short clone outperforms 
the Credit Suisse Long/Short Hedge Fund Index.  
 
All three clones in figures 11-13 yield higher returns than the hedge fund indices at the 
end of the estimation period. These returns are usually from the end of 2011 to the end 
of 2014. Also similar pattern was obtained in earlier graphs. This may be due to August 
2011 and heightened uncertainty in stock markets when the markets fell in many 
countries. Some countries were concerned about their credit ratings, e.g. United States 
and France and at the same time the European debt crisis was still novel. This would be 
in line with Wallerstein et al. (2010) who find that during economic downturns the 
replication products perform better than their target funds.  
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Figures 11 (above), 12 (middle) and 13 (below).  Monthly returns for the Fixed 
Income Arbitrage, Global macro and Long/Short Indices, their clone returns and the 
clones’ average monthly p-value during September 2004 and August 2015.!
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Below is shown a figure for the Managed Futures category. Unlike other strategies, 
Managed Futures does not suffer from a big downturn in returns at the end of 2008. The 
return pattern for both the clone and the index is more like a movement going upwards 
and downwards without showing any pattern easy to interpret. Scrutinizing the figure, 
similar result is obtained than from the previous graphs. The clone generates higher 
average monthly returns than its counterpart from the August 2011 till the end of 2014. 
P-value is significant only one time and it is in October 2011: 0,089. In November 2011 
the p-value is already 0,103 indicating statistical insignificance.  
 
 
Figure 14. Monthly returns for the Managed Futures Index, its clone’s monthly return 
and the clone’s average monthly p-value during September 2004 and August 2015.!
 
To conclude the findings from the figures (figures 5-14), the Long/Short rolling-
window clone performs the best from all of the rolling-window clones. Two times 
during the estimation period it generates higher monthly returns than the Long/Short 
Hedge Fund Index. A clear conclusion, however, is not that the clone would still 
outperform the index. It only managed to generate higher returns during few sample 
months: on average, the index still outperforms the clone. Also, all figures 5-14 
supports the findings in table 7 and confirm that the clones yield higher average returns 
during the post-crisis period.  
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The estimated beta coefficients used as portfolio weights for the fixed-weight clones 
were largely statistically significant. This suggests that the factors chosen have a good 
fit in the risk-factor regression model. Despite the high significance of these fixed-
weight estimated coefficients, the clones showed bad performance when monthly 
returns were computed. In order to obtain whether the significances of the factors are 
different among the rolling-window linear clones, table below was computed. All of the 
factors are insignificant with only few exceptions: the Bond and the 10Year during the 
pre-crisis. This may indicate that some other factors in the linear factor model could 
work better and have higher ability to explain the hedge fund index risk exposures. On 
the other hand as mentioned above the same factors showed a good fit for the fixed-
weight linear clones.  
 
Table 8. Averages of the monthly p-values for the eight factors in the linear factor 
model. The whole period covers estimation period from September 2004 to August 
2015, the Pre-crisis from September 2004 to August 2008 and the Post-crisis from 
September 2008 to August 2015.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007: 24) explain higher average performance of fixed-weight 
clones by combined effects of look ahead bias for fixed-weight clones and increased   
estimation errors implicit in the rolling-window clones. The rolling-window clones are 
based on smaller sample size and therefore easier object for the estimation errors. These 
effects may partly explain the low significance of the factors estimated for the rolling-
window linear clones in this thesis, although they delivered higher average returns than 
the fixed-weight linear clones. Due to these higher average returns, they are next 
analyzed further. 
 
 
 Whole period Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
 avg p-value avg p-value avg p-value SP500 0,35 0,44 0,31 
MSCI 0,36 0,34 0,38 
Size-Spread 0,45 0,38 0,49 
Credit 0,37 0,46 0,31 
Bond 0,13 0,06 0,17 
Commodity 0,43 0,51 0,38 
10Year 0,23 0,10 0,30 
USD 0,37 0,38 0,36 
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In order to test not only the replication performance, but also quality, correlations 
between the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Indices and the 24-month rolling-window clones 
are computed. Regression results are presented in table 9 below. Correlations are 
relatively high as expected. During the whole estimation period from 2004 to 2015 the 
correlation coefficients vary from 0,54 for the Managed Futures to 0,98 for the Short 
Bias. Bollen and Fisher (2013) used two different length for the estimation windows; 
12-month and 48-month and they did not find that the length of the window would 
significantly affect to the correlation between the index and its clone. However, in this 
thesis only estimation window is applied. According to the finding of Bollen and Fisher 
mentioned above it should be enough to bring comprehensive results.  
 
Table 9. Correlation coefficients of the monthly return of 10 Hedge Fund Indices and 
the corresponding clones. Also adjusted R-squares for the regressions are shown. The 
“whole period” is estimation period from September 2004 to August 2015, the “Pre-
crisis” from September 2004 to August 2008 and the “Post-crisis” from September 2008 
to August 2015. 
 
 
Whole period Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
CS Index 
  
 
  
Hedge fund  0,76 0,70 0,91 0,77 0,74 0,73 
Convertible Arb 0,89 0,70 1,05 0,51 0,90 0,75 
Short Bias 0,98 0,75 0,95 0,61 0,99 0,84 
Emerging Market 0,88 0,81 0,95 0,87 0,87 0,82 
Equity Neutral 0,82 0,71 0,39 0,17 0,82 0,71 
Event Distressed 0,72 0,68 0,82 0,60 0,75 0,76 
Fixed Inc Arb 0,87 0,75 0,96 0,51 0,86 0,79 
Global Macro 0,67 0,42 0,92 0,61 0,63 0,43 
Long/Short 0,87 0,79 0,95 0,83 0,85 0,79 
Managed Futures 0,54 0,26 0,58 0,28 0,58 0,29 
 
The table above presents correlations between the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Indices 
and the clones. Earlier studies argue that in order to make hedge fund replication 
products attractive alternatives to investors, they should offer diversification 
opportunities as actual hedge funds are argued to offer. In the interest of these blames, 
also correlations between the rolling-window linear clones and the S&P 500 are 
regressed. The results are presented in table 10 on the next page. 
 
 
!!!"#$%! ! !!!"#$%! !!"#$%! !! !! !! 
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Table 10. Listed correlations between the Hedge Fund Index clones and the S&P 500. 
The Whole period is September 2004 through August 2015. The Pre-crisis period is 
from September 2004 to August 2008 and the Post-crisis periods covers a time period 
from September 2008 to August 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The correlation coefficients between the Hedge Fund Index clones and S&P 500 are 
generally quite low. Some of the clones show higher values - values over 0,5 – the 
Emerging Market during the whole sample period (0,51) and post-crisis (0,52) and the 
Long/Short during the pre-crisis (0,53). Without few exceptions the correlations are 
higher, on average, during the post-crisis period. Moreover, to investigate whether the 
clones rather than the target indices have lower correlations with the S&P 500 table 
below is computed. Table 11 presents correlations between the target Hedge Fund 
Indices and the S&P 500.  
 
Table 11. Listed correlations between the Hedge Fund Indices and the S&P 500. The 
Whole period is September 2004 through August 2015. The Pre-crisis period is from 
September 2004 to August 2008 and finally the Post-crisis periods covers a time period 
from September 2008 to August 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
CS Index clone Whole period Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Hedge fund 0,33 0,32 0,33 
Convertible Arb 0,33 0,17 0,36 
Short Bias -0,73 -1,05 -0,67 
Emerging Market 0,51 0,43 0,52 
Equity Neutral 0,39 0,07 0,45 
Event Distressed 0,32 0,26 0,33 
Fixed Income Arb 0,28 0,09 0,32 
Global Macro 0,14 0,05 0,15 
Long/Short 0,46 0,53 0,44 
Managed Futures 0,09 0,47 0,01 
!
!!
!
!!
!
!!
CS Index  Whole period Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Hedge fund 0,29 0,28 0,30 
Convertible Arb 0,29 0,22 0,31 
Short Bias -0,79 -1,23 -0,71 
Emerging Market 0,46 0,41 0,48 
Equity Neutral 0,31 0,01 0,37 
Event Distressed 0,28 0,24 0,29 
Fixed Income Arb 0,24 0,13 0,27 
Global Macro 0,11 -0,02 0,14 
Long/Short 0,44 0,49 0,43 
Managed Futures 0,07 0,25 0,04 
!!!&!500 
!!!&!500 
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Comparing the tables 10 and 11 on the previous page one can observe that the indices 
rather than the clones have lower correlation with the S&P 500. There are however few 
exceptions. During the pre-crisis period the Convertible Arbitrage clone has a 
correlation of 0,17 with the S&P 500 whereas the Convertible Arbitrage Hedge Fund 
Index shows correlation of 0,22. Also the Fixed Income Arbitrage clone delivers lower 
correlation with the S&P 500 than the index during the pre-crisis period (0,09 vs 0,13). 
During the post-crisis period the Managed Futures clone shows lower correlation than 
the index (0,01 vs 0,04).  
 
The findings in previous tables suggest that on average, the correlations between the 
target indices and corresponding clones are high. On the other hand, the correlations 
between the clones and the S&P 500 are lower. Although the clones show relatively low 
correlation with the S&P 500, the actual target indices tend to be even less correlated 
with the S&P 500. Also Bollen and Fisher (2012) examine these correlations with the 
same Hedge Fund Index catgories in their sample. They find similar results: clones have 
higher average correlation with the S&P 500. Their results also suggest higher average 
correlation between the clones and the S&P 500 than the clones and target indices. This 
suggestion, however, differs from the results in this thesis. Finally, the correlation 
between the clones and the S&P 500 is only slightly higher than the correlation between 
the counterparty index and the S&P 500.  
 
These findings are crucial for the thesis as they suggest achieving diversification from 
standard asset classes such as U.S. equities, at some extend. This finding is in line with 
Hasanhodzic and Lo (2013) who suggest that the hedge fund clones exhibit correlations 
that are similar to those of the target portfolios, thus their results showing larger 
variation. For example, in their results the Convertible Arbitrage hedge fund portfolio 
has a correlation of 0,48 with the S&P 500, correlation of -0,29 with the 3-month 
LIBOR, correlation of 0,06 with the US Dollar Index and correlation of 0,79 with the 
CSFB/Tremont Convertible Arbitrage Index. In comparison, the fixed-weight 
Convertible Arbitrage clone has correlations of 0,63, -0,35, 0,01 and 0,37, respectively.  
 
Finally, according to the findings, the replication products can offer relatively good 
diversification benefits for the investors. For the most of the strategies these 
diversification benefits are only slightly lower than those of the matching indices and in 
few of the cases, even slightly higher.  
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6.4. Discussion 
 
Findings of this thesis suggest that the rolling-window clones perform relatively poorly. 
However, it is hard to make a conclusion stating which clone type performs better than 
the other one. Both clone types show different abilities when measured with different 
tools: the average monthly return, the p-values and the correlation coefficients. These 
mixed results are in line with earlier literature. The estimated monthly regression 
coefficients for the fixed-weight clones were largely highly statistically significant 
whereas the average monthly p-values for the rolling-window coefficients were almost 
all insignificant.  
 
Comparing the fixed-weight and the rolling-window linear clones to each other as well 
as to the corresponding indices, the results are mixed. In times the rolling-window linear 
clones managed to deliver higher average annual returns than the targets hence these 
results being insignificant. The fixed-weight linear clones instead did not really yield 
higher average returns than the indices in any of the three sample periods. One clone, 
the Equity Neutral showed higher average returns thus them being also statistically 
insignificant. Also when looking at the factors over the three sample periods mixed 
results were obtained. Same eight factors were used in order to conduct both clone 
types. However, the chosen factors showed higher statistical significance among the 
fixed-weight clones rather than the rolling-window clones. This may be explained for 
example by a smaller sample size in the rolling-window approach that leads to 
sensitiveness to estimation errors.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
Hedge fund replication products are a relatively new choice for a large group of 
investors.  The approach aims to bring risk-adjusted returns similar to hedge funds with 
lower costs and increased transparency. In the replication procedures the focus is on the 
hedge fund beta exposures rather than the manager specific alphas. In this thesis ten 
Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Indices: a broad based flag ship index and nine strategy-
based sub-indices are replicated. Two different replication approaches are conducted: a 
passive fixed-weight and a time-varying rolling-window in which a 24-month window 
is applied. In both cases first the monthly returns of the target indices are regressed with 
factor returns in order to estimate monthly beta coefficients that are then used as 
portfolio weights in the replicating portfolios. The regression model includes eight 
different common factors that are chosen based on previous literature suggesting their 
ability to gauge the common hedge fund risk exposures. The final monthly replicator 
returns are conducted by multiplying the estimated portfolio weights with the monthly 
factor returns.  
The findings suggest that although in some hedge fund categories the clones show 
higher average annual raw returns than the targets, their performance is not directly 
comparable with the corresponding indices. When measured on a risk-adjusted basis, 
the clones deliver lower annual Sharpe ratios suggesting that the clones perform worse. 
In terms of the annual volatility, the fixed-weight clones outperform the indices whereas 
the rolling-window clones deliver similar volatilities than the indices, on average. 
However, an important finding is that it is possible to identify risk factors that affect 
part of the hedge fund returns and to obtain similar returns to hedge funds using these 
identified risk exposures. 
The fixed-weight linear clones were found to deliver higher statistical significance than 
rolling-window clones. However, the rolling-window clones generally yielded higher 
average monthly and annual raw returns than the fixed-weight linear clones. In addition, 
the clones with rolling-window approach may be more attainable and flexible in terms 
of capturing non-stationarities such as the time-varying means. This is largely in 
contrast with earlier research (e.g. Hasanhodzic and Lo 2007) that has found the fixed-
weight clones to deliver higher average return performance on both raw- and risk-
adjusted basis. During the whole estimation period from 2004 to 2015, one fixed-weight 
linear clone and three rolling-window linear clones were found to outperform their 
counterparties. The estimation period was also divided into two sub-sample periods: 
pre-crisis and post-crisis. The findings suggest that the post-crisis clone performance 
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was better than that of the Hedge Fund Indices. This finding was found when using the 
rolling-window out-of-sample estimation approach. The finding is partly in line with 
earlier research (Wallerstein et al. 2010) suggesting that the clones can outperform the 
hedge funds during economic downturns. However, the clones delivered higher returns 
with a lag after the crisis time. Furthermore, the higher annual returns among the clones 
were largely statistically insignificant. The fixed-weight linear coefficients showed high 
statistical significance in the risk exposure analysis, but the clone that outperformed its 
counterparty was statistically insignificant. Also the rolling-window linear clones 
showed high statistical insignificancy.  
In order to analyze the replicating quality, the correlations between the clones and the 
indices were regressed. As expected, clones were found to have relatively high 
correlations with their target indices. This indicates that the clones are able to mimic 
their targets well. Moreover, the correlations between the clones and the S&P 500 and 
the targets and S&P 500 were computed. The clones were found to have only slightly 
higher correlation with the S&P 500 than what the target indices have. This finding 
suggests that the replication products offer diversification benefits similar to those of 
the target indices. 
Finally, the findings partly support the hypothesis. The passive linear hedge fund clones 
did not outperform the corresponding hedge fund indices. Although the results seen in 
this thesis were promising at early stage – high statistical significance was shown in the 
beta coefficient estimation part – the final replication products did not unambiguously 
outperform their target indices. The results however give hope for the future replication 
attempts and replication research, as hedge fund risk exposures were obtained with 
common factors as well as higher clone returns were found in few of the index 
categories. All these findings together with earlier research give hope for investors of 
cheaper investments in the future. With more research of different methods or only 
different factors, better results may be obtained in the future. 
 
As replication products become available for investors like mutual funds some investors 
may use them as another type of equity investment. Finally, it will be interesting to 
follow how the hedge fund and the hedge fund replication industries will develop in the 
future and whether other will replace the other.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1.  Monthly returns (%-change) for the factors between 2004 and 2015. 
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Appendix 2. Monthly return decomposition for the Credit Suisse Broad Hedge Fund 
Index rolling-window clone. 
 
 
SP500 MSCI 
Size-
Spread Credit Bond Commodity 10Year USD Tot.return: 
2004M09 0,067 % -0,022 % 0,408 % 0,290 % -0,261 % 0,383 % -0,017 % 0,237 % 1,085 % 
2004M10 0,143 % 0,004 % 0,057 % 0,147 % 0,145 % 0,130 % -0,224 % 0,345 % 0,746 % 
2004M11 0,298 % 0,205 % 0,443 % 0,165 % -1,381 % -0,110 % 1,017 % 0,633 % 1,270 % 
2004M12 0,193 % 0,137 % 0,045 % 0,166 % 0,290 % -0,144 % -0,411 % 0,217 % 0,492 % 
2005M01 -0,233 % 0,006 % -0,173 % 0,489 % -0,275 % 0,064 % -0,198 % -0,471 % -0,790 % 
2005M02 0,203 % 0,269 % 0,020 % 0,889 % -0,894 % -0,008 % 0,547 % 0,185 % 1,212 % 
2005M03 -0,202 % -0,134 % -0,131 % 0,813 % -0,800 % 0,053 % 0,256 % -0,252 % -0,396 % 
2005M04 -0,225 % -0,059 % -0,402 % 0,790 % 0,567 % -0,154 % -0,569 % -0,063 % -0,116 % 
2005M05 0,238 % 0,137 % 0,294 % 1,247 % 0,336 % -0,011 % -0,451 % -0,728 % 1,063 % 
2005M06 0,010 % 0,118 % 0,273 % 1,121 % 0,676 % 0,095 % -0,229 % -0,291 % 1,773 % 
2005M07 0,096 % 0,423 % 0,286 % 0,750 % -0,990 % 0,055 % 1,190 % -0,048 % 1,763 % 
2005M08 -0,026 % 0,048 % -0,088 % 0,857 % 0,623 % 0,148 % -0,761 % 0,375 % 1,176 % 
2005M09 0,013 % 0,929 % -0,011 % 0,612 % -0,959 % 0,000 % 0,970 % -0,255 % 1,301 % 
2005M10 -0,123 % -0,710 % -0,097 % 0,295 % -0,759 % -0,237 % 0,700 % -0,051 % -0,983 % 
2005M11 0,338 % 0,953 % 0,085 % 0,225 % 0,075 % -0,088 % -0,159 % -0,101 % 1,328 % 
2005M12 0,004 % 0,718 % -0,006 % 0,055 % 0,178 % 0,080 % -0,297 % 0,032 % 0,764 % 
2006M01 0,216 % 1,480 % 0,103 % -0,067 % -0,120 % 0,122 % 0,442 % 0,223 % 2,400 % 
2006M02 0,015 % -0,013 % -0,011 % -0,090 % -0,228 % -0,201 % 0,065 % -0,120 % -0,582 % 
2006M03 0,105 % 0,109 % 0,094 % -0,261 % -0,848 % 0,134 % 1,092 % 0,040 % 0,465 % 
2006M04 0,096 % 0,861 % -0,027 % -0,151 % -0,350 % 0,150 % 0,711 % 0,349 % 1,638 % 
2006M05 -0,338 % -1,169 % -0,084 % -0,094 % -0,279 % -0,022 % 0,124 % 0,142 % -1,719 % 
2006M06 0,014 % -0,024 % 0,014 % -0,008 % -0,219 % 0,030 % 0,076 % -0,058 % -0,175 % 
2006M07 0,044 % 0,169 % -0,149 % 0,047 % 0,602 % 0,045 % -0,461 % -0,010 % 0,286 % 
2006M08 0,128 % 0,315 % 0,063 % 0,076 % 0,749 % -0,122 % -0,780 % 0,034 % 0,463 % 
2006M09 0,084 % 0,101 % -0,057 % 0,111 % 0,312 % -0,243 % -0,298 % -0,137 % -0,127 % 
2006M10 0,133 % 0,565 % 0,257 % 0,091 % 0,167 % -0,060 % -0,079 % 0,096 % 1,170 % 
2006M11 0,076 % 0,886 % 0,099 % 0,120 % 0,466 % 0,122 % -0,457 % 0,380 % 1,691 % 
2006M12 -0,068 % 0,656 % -0,044 % -0,213 % -0,632 % -0,240 % 0,984 % -0,041 % 0,403 % 
2007M01 -0,019 % -0,134 % 0,052 % -0,295 % -0,329 % -0,088 % 0,442 % -0,028 % -0,400 % 
2007M02 -0,020 % -0,077 % 0,031 % -0,225 % 0,897 % 0,160 % -1,000 % 0,060 % -0,174 % 
2007M03 -0,017 % 0,600 % 0,027 % -0,196 % -0,388 % 0,066 % 0,388 % 0,065 % 0,545 % 
2007M04 0,205 % 0,668 % -0,063 % -0,175 % 0,125 % -0,007 % -0,077 % 0,182 % 0,859 % 
2007M05 0,340 % 0,623 % 0,121 % -0,193 % -0,846 % -0,056 % 0,904 % -0,048 % 0,843 % 
2007M06 -0,228 % 0,534 % -0,027 % -0,055 % -0,362 % 0,116 % 0,419 % 0,024 % 0,420 % 
2007M07 -0,541 % 0,567 % -0,333 % 0,000 % -0,044 % 0,263 % -0,722 % 0,057 % -0,752 % 
2007M08 0,270 % -0,249 % 0,026 % -0,215 % 0,219 % -0,220 % -0,617 % -0,002 % -0,787 % 
2007M09 0,644 % 1,477 % -0,003 % -0,353 % 0,164 % 0,615 % 0,094 % 0,061 % 2,699 % 
2007M10 0,183 % 1,627 % 0,052 % -0,188 % 0,171 % 0,482 % -0,344 % 0,012 % 1,996 % 
2007M11 -0,252 % -1,023 % -0,217 % -0,139 % 0,401 % -0,137 % -1,534 % -0,014 % -2,915 % 
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2007M12 -0,048 % 0,052 % 0,019 % -0,262 % -0,026 % 0,207 % 0,213 % 0,017 % 0,172 % 
2008M01 -0,138 % -1,755 % -0,201 % -0,126 % 1,264 % 0,000 % -1,563 % 0,093 % -2,427 % 
2008M02 -0,045 % 1,083 % -0,114 % -0,064 % 0,156 % 0,175 % -0,473 % 0,090 % 0,809 % 
2008M03 0,003 % -0,860 % 0,040 % -0,223 % -1,028 % -0,009 % -0,436 % 0,117 % -2,396 % 
2008M04 -0,458 % 1,440 % 0,081 % -0,547 % -0,281 % -0,099 % 1,315 % -0,111 % 1,340 % 
2008M05 -0,116 % 0,281 % 0,601 % -0,452 % -0,980 % 0,151 % 1,068 % -0,039 % 0,515 % 
2008M06 0,907 % -1,023 % -0,283 % -0,844 % -0,805 % 0,590 % -0,237 % 0,003 % -1,691 % 
2008M07 -0,006 % -0,236 % 0,156 % -1,332 % -0,242 % -1,461 % 0,008 % 0,066 % -3,047 % 
2008M08 0,023 % -0,486 % 0,076 % -1,339 % 0,123 % -0,888 % -0,374 % 0,480 % -2,386 % 
2008M09 -0,204 % -1,063 % -0,087 % -2,112 % -2,211 % -1,597 % 0,025 % 0,170 % -7,079 % 
2008M10 0,483 % -2,205 % 0,227 % -3,302 % -0,946 % -2,620 % 0,554 % 0,297 % -7,512 % 
2008M11 0,129 % -0,801 % 0,241 % -2,742 % 1,632 % -1,268 % -2,550 % 0,077 % -5,282 % 
2008M12 -0,041 % 0,811 % 0,160 % -2,013 % 3,913 % -1,122 % -2,516 % -0,134 % -0,942 % 
2009M01 0,413 % -0,686 % -0,126 % -1,337 % -0,281 % -0,790 % 3,137 % 0,053 % 0,384 % 
2009M02 0,853 % -0,655 % -0,180 % -1,398 % -0,843 % -0,532 % 0,839 % 0,037 % -1,881 % 
2009M03 -0,185 % 1,648 % 0,037 % -0,825 % -0,121 % 0,459 % -1,280 % -0,143 % -0,410 % 
2009M04 -0,809 % 2,073 % 0,336 % -0,556 % 0,885 % -0,123 % 1,168 % -0,117 % 2,858 % 
2009M05 -0,743 % 1,956 % -0,066 % -0,080 % 1,067 % 3,313 % 0,636 % -1,200 % 4,883 % 
2009M06 -0,026 % -0,150 % 0,132 % -0,038 % 0,519 % 0,097 % 0,091 % 0,214 % 0,839 % 
2009M07 -1,062 % 1,625 % 0,291 % -0,056 % 1,330 % 0,063 % -0,032 % -0,391 % 1,766 % 
2009M08 -0,313 % -0,046 % 0,002 % -0,006 % 0,351 % -0,260 % -0,173 % -0,032 % -0,478 % 
2009M09 -0,441 % 1,611 % -0,008 % 0,124 % 0,110 % 0,015 % -0,156 % -0,292 % 0,962 % 
2009M10 0,224 % 0,021 % -0,305 % 0,149 % 0,251 % 0,581 % 0,128 % -0,076 % 0,974 % 
2009M11 -0,468 % 0,664 % -0,010 % 0,181 % 0,428 % 0,132 % -0,297 % -0,294 % 0,337 % 
2009M12 -0,067 % 0,516 % -0,205 % 0,305 % -0,830 % 0,085 % 1,054 % 0,536 % 1,394 % 
2010M01 0,129 % -0,638 % 0,029 % 0,387 % 0,343 % -0,791 % -0,355 % 0,217 % -0,678 % 
2010M02 -0,175 % 0,049 % -0,057 % 0,325 % -0,011 % 0,557 % 0,035 % 0,133 % 0,856 % 
2010M03 -0,402 % 1,167 % -0,103 % 0,423 % -0,237 % 0,188 % 0,300 % 0,115 % 1,451 % 
2010M04 -0,064 % 0,187 % -0,232 % 0,433 % 0,416 % 0,283 % -0,226 % 0,152 % 0,950 % 
2010M05 -0,135 % -0,991 % 0,178 % 0,256 % -0,455 % -1,211 % -0,674 % 0,514 % -2,517 % 
2010M06 -0,594 % -0,106 % 0,628 % 0,262 % 0,540 % 0,007 % -0,870 % -0,069 % -0,201 % 
2010M07 0,716 % 1,270 % -0,313 % 0,304 % 0,490 % 0,097 % -0,080 % -0,613 % 1,871 % 
2010M08 -0,454 % -0,302 % 0,608 % 0,317 % 0,397 % -0,085 % -1,118 % 0,262 % -0,374 % 
2010M09 1,023 % 1,423 % -0,782 % 0,356 % 0,066 % 0,228 % 0,103 % -0,566 % 1,850 % 
2010M10 0,508 % 0,317 % -0,194 % 0,358 % 0,038 % 0,058 % 0,323 % -0,175 % 1,233 % 
2010M11 0,002 % -0,220 % -0,536 % 0,236 % -0,673 % 0,019 % 0,527 % 0,525 % -0,120 % 
2010M12 1,218 % 0,531 % -0,535 % 0,229 % -0,790 % 0,150 % 1,372 % -0,224 % 1,951 % 
2011M01 0,359 % -0,242 % 0,168 % 0,270 % -0,197 % 0,109 % 0,121 % -0,150 % 0,437 % 
2011M02 0,687 % -0,096 % -0,227 % 0,595 % -0,047 % 0,178 % 0,018 % -0,095 % 1,013 % 
2011M03 0,009 % 0,509 % -0,200 % 0,523 % -0,178 % 0,173 % 0,024 % -0,110 % 0,750 % 
2011M04 0,649 % 0,280 % -0,044 % 0,330 % 0,464 % 0,007 % -0,186 % -0,211 % 1,290 % 
2011M05 -0,256 % -0,182 % 0,033 % 0,396 % 0,291 % 0,004 % -0,298 % 0,091 % 0,080 % 
2011M06 -0,419 % -0,129 % 0,047 % 0,390 % -0,375 % -0,117 % 0,048 % -0,040 % -0,596 % 
2011M07 -0,425 % -0,031 % -0,049 % -0,081 % 0,634 % 0,046 % -0,245 % -0,030 % -0,181 % 
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2011M08 -1,123 % -0,770 % -0,093 % -0,011 % -0,198 % -0,034 % -0,455 % 0,017 % -2,667 % 
2011M09 -1,700 % -0,882 % 0,469 % 0,198 % -0,409 % -0,525 % -0,198 % 0,398 % -2,648 % 
2011M10 2,975 % 0,962 % -1,224 % 1,004 % 0,104 % 0,472 % -0,044 % -0,285 % 3,964 % 
2011M11 -0,054 % -0,260 % 0,023 % -0,140 % -0,201 % 0,123 % 0,009 % 0,323 % -0,177 % 
2011M12 0,311 % -0,048 % -0,001 % 0,234 % 0,150 % -0,172 % 0,193 % 0,266 % 0,933 % 
2012M01 1,517 % 1,522 % -0,939 % 0,713 % -0,056 % 0,244 % 0,202 % -0,257 % 2,948 % 
2012M02 1,467 % 0,715 % 0,059 % 1,327 % -0,014 % 0,717 % -0,594 % -0,163 % 3,515 % 
2012M03 1,254 % -0,422 % -0,097 % 1,287 % 0,107 % -0,236 % -0,748 % 0,084 % 1,230 % 
2012M04 -0,237 % -0,149 % 0,249 % 1,277 % -0,063 % -0,051 % 0,795 % -0,070 % 1,751 % 
2012M05 -2,275 % -1,280 % 0,485 % 1,057 % 0,003 % -0,983 % 1,106 % 1,331 % -0,556 % 
2012M06 1,810 % 0,496 % -0,490 % 1,215 % -0,028 % 0,093 % -0,405 % -0,502 % 2,190 % 
2012M07 0,578 % 0,198 % 0,355 % 1,703 % -0,108 % 0,298 % 0,699 % 0,263 % 3,985 % 
2012M08 0,819 % -0,017 % -0,192 % 1,525 % 0,000 % 0,443 % -0,263 % -0,292 % 2,022 % 
2012M09 0,880 % 0,409 % -0,179 % 1,723 % -0,017 % -0,095 % -0,208 % -0,263 % 2,251 % 
2012M10 -0,576 % -0,041 % 0,102 % 2,065 % 0,006 % -0,291 % -0,114 % -0,004 % 1,147 % 
2012M11 0,154 % 0,089 % -0,006 % 1,805 % 0,001 % 0,135 % 0,146 % 0,066 % 2,390 % 
2012M12 0,157 % 0,342 % 0,065 % 1,657 % -0,049 % -0,054 % -0,188 % -0,091 % 1,838 % 
2013M01 1,007 % 0,093 % 0,086 % 1,709 % -0,057 % 0,384 % -0,339 % -0,156 % 2,727 % 
2013M02 0,185 % -0,074 % 0,009 % 1,429 % 0,050 % -0,439 % 0,042 % 0,652 % 1,854 % 
2013M03 0,044 % -0,153 % 0,256 % 1,595 % -0,016 % 0,109 % 0,011 % 0,383 % 2,230 % 
2013M04 0,268 % 0,079 % -0,040 % 2,044 % 0,013 % -0,448 % 0,211 % -0,407 % 1,721 % 
2013M05 0,327 % -0,261 % 0,088 % 1,884 % -0,058 % -0,118 % -0,679 % 0,434 % 1,618 % 
2013M06 -0,186 % -0,707 % 0,007 % 1,098 % -0,068 % 0,016 % -0,313 % -0,033 % -0,186 % 
2013M07 0,813 % 0,115 % 0,098 % 1,263 % 0,003 % 0,317 % -0,102 % -0,471 % 2,036 % 
2013M08 -0,434 % -0,165 % -0,034 % 1,156 % -0,046 % 0,238 % -0,137 % 0,172 % 0,748 % 
2013M09 0,445 % 0,647 % 0,158 % 1,054 % 0,070 % -0,177 % 0,099 % -0,467 % 1,830 % 
2013M10 0,759 % 0,513 % -0,017 % 1,160 % 0,057 % -0,078 % 0,059 % -0,005 % 2,447 % 
2013M11 0,515 % -0,140 % 0,139 % 1,059 % -0,045 % -0,028 % -0,111 % 0,094 % 1,483 % 
2013M12 0,461 % -0,120 % 0,019 % 1,155 % -0,166 % 0,067 % -0,076 % -0,110 % 1,231 % 
2014M01 -0,688 % -0,384 % -0,013 % 1,572 % 0,175 % -0,055 % 0,084 % 0,171 % 0,862 % 
2014M02 0,906 % 0,187 % 0,053 % 1,753 % 0,037 % 0,147 % 0,002 % -0,210 % 2,874 % 
2014M03 0,183 % 0,040 % -0,068 % 1,583 % -0,158 % 0,003 % -0,008 % 0,031 % 1,606 % 
2014M04 0,146 % 0,008 % -0,541 % 1,592 % 0,090 % 0,021 % 0,025 % -0,080 % 1,261 % 
2014M05 0,456 % 0,089 % -0,094 % 1,714 % 0,193 % -0,007 % 0,016 % 0,071 % 2,438 % 
2014M06 0,453 % 0,107 % 0,300 % 0,580 % -0,197 % 0,042 % 0,041 % -0,030 % 1,296 % 
2014M07 -0,306 % 0,055 % -0,453 % 0,849 % -0,237 % 0,006 % 0,035 % 0,023 % -0,028 % 
2014M08 0,807 % 0,072 % 0,152 % 0,550 % 0,375 % -0,012 % -0,274 % -0,035 % 1,636 % 
2014M09 -0,316 % -0,095 % -0,190 % 0,480 % -0,538 % 0,039 % 0,246 % -0,037 % -0,412 % 
2014M10 0,559 % 0,027 % -0,291 % 0,360 % 0,316 % -0,206 % -0,307 % -0,046 % 0,412 % 
2014M11 0,720 % -0,006 % 0,125 % 0,222 % 0,163 % 0,133 % -0,314 % -0,123 % 0,920 % 
2014M12 -0,080 % 0,177 % -0,268 % 0,175 % -0,331 % 0,234 % -0,045 % -0,147 % -0,287 % 
2015M01 -0,787 % -0,005 % 0,101 % -0,230 % 1,486 % 0,122 % -0,861 % 0,024 % -0,149 % 
2015M02 1,530 % -0,041 % -0,173 % -0,253 % -0,782 % -0,110 % 0,668 % 0,008 % 0,848 % 
2015M03 -0,343 % -0,014 % -0,171 % -0,283 % 0,008 % 0,192 % -0,154 % 0,065 % -0,700 % 
! 74 
2015M04 0,220 % 0,120 % 0,132 % -0,423 % -0,242 % -0,131 % 0,216 % -0,408 % -0,517 % 
2015M05 0,312 % -0,032 % -0,070 % -0,405 % -0,376 % 0,007 % 0,078 % 0,299 % -0,187 % 
2015M06 -0,511 % 0,016 % -0,103 % -0,169 % -0,625 % -0,001 % 0,309 % -0,212 % -1,295 % 
2015M07 0,554 % 0,083 % 0,086 % -0,098 % 0,013 % -0,247 % -0,132 % 0,268 % 0,529 % 
2015M08 -1,724 % 0,014 % 0,080 % -0,001 % -0,201 % 0,003 % -0,005 % -0,235 % -2,068 % 
 
